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Abstract 
In 1994 a war broke out between Russia and Chechnya, and the purpose of this thesis 
is to investigate the following: Was the democratization process a cause of the war? 
The analysis applies a theory developed by Jack Snyder and colleagues. This theory 
claims that the democratization process can contribute to the outbreak of war, given 
certain circumstances. The problem, according to the theory, is that a weak 
institutional framework not only prevents the institutions from functioning properly, 
but that they also allow for different elites to take advantage of the weak institutions. 
If elites feel sufficiently threatened by the democratization process, they will be prone 
to resort to nationalist rhetoric. This can mobilize the population in a violent 
direction, and a conflict can be the outcome. The analysis is thus focused on three 
main aspects of the democratization processes in Russia and Chechnya. First; the 
institutional development, second; the elite competition and third; the nationalist 
mobilization. This is a case study in which mainly secondary sources are used to trace 
the impacts of, and relationships between, historical events in the processes leading 
up to the war. The findings suggest that the democratization process in fact had a 
significant influence on the decision to go to war on both sides. Weak institutions and 
elite competition led to a dangerous environment in both Russia and Chechnya, and 
in both places the use of nationalist rhetoric played a role in the immediate period 
before the war. A finding, which somehow challenges Snyder’s theory, is that the 
difference to which the national identities were developed in Russia and Chechnya 
prior to the onset of democratization also mattered for the likelihood of the use of 
nationalist rhetoric by the elites. Thus, not every assumption made in the theory fits 
with this case. It is nevertheless necessary to include the democratization process 
when analyzing what led to the outbreak of the Russo-Chechen war. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Question 
In December 1994, Russian and Chechen military forces clashed in Grozny, in what 
was to become a brutal and prolonged war. Peaceful problem solving mechanisms 
could perhaps have solved the conflict, but these were not used. What made the two 
sides choose confrontation? Numerous efforts have been made to explain the motives 
behind the use of violence. Some see the war as a direct consequence of the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union, and the need for Russia to protect its territorial 
integrity. Others emphasize the struggle for control over natural resources in the 
North Caucasus. Still others maintain that the personal traits of the leaders in Russia 
and Chechnya were decisive. The democratization process has been viewed as a 
contributing factor to the unstable environment leading to conflict. But whether the 
democratization process as such was a direct source of war has not yet been 
extensively studied. This thesis aims to fill this research gap by asking: 
Was the democratization process a cause of the Russo-Chechen war? 
1.2 Analytical approach 
Democracy and regime change have for many years been subject to academic 
debates. Some theories emphasize the potential democracy has for promoting peace, 
while others argue that the link between democracy and peace is not that obvious. 
While democracy may indeed promote peace, the process of moving from an 
authoritarian to a democratic state may have the opposite effect. 
In this analysis I will apply a theory developed by Jack Snyder and colleagues, who 
hold that democratization, in certain circumstances, can lead to conflict. Snyder 
argues that the opening of society during a democratization process can lead to harsh 
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competition for power between desperate elites, and provoke the employment of 
extreme measures in this struggle. This is because the democratization process 
allocates more influence to the population as voters, and the elites need support from 
them in order to gain power. Sudden, unrestricted freedom of speech and rapid 
institutional changes can trigger the elites to employ extreme measures in a situation 
where the division of power is not yet set. An important element in the theory is how 
the elites can use nationalist rhetoric to mobilize the population for support. The 
institutional development is a crucial factor as well, both because weak institutions 
are dangerous, and because they determine the environment in which the elite can 
operate. Elites can take advantage of institutional weaknesses, if they view 
democratic institutions as limiting their own ability to achieve power. The 
combination of threatened elites, institutional vacuum and a more open public space 
might lead to a situation where the outbreak of a violent conflict is imminent. The 
analysis will thus focus on three factors: the institutional development, elite 
competition and the nationalist mobilization. These factors work together to produce 
a violent outcome.  
Snyder’s theory is relevant for many of the challenges which arose in the 
democratization process during and after the fall of the Soviet Union. Opportunistic 
elites and weak institutions were central features in both Russia and Chechnya at this 
time. The democratization process in the Soviet Union, in which Russia and 
Chechnya were administrative units, started in the late 1980s. I will examine the 
period from the introduction of democratization and until the outbreak of war in 
1994. The war itself will thus not be examined. Developments in Russia and 
Chechnya were in some respect similar, especially in the early stages. The 
developments after the fall of the Soviet Union were quite different, however. 
Russia was a union republic (RSFSR), and in practice the administrative and 
economic center of the Soviet Union. In 1991 Russia became a sovereign state, and 
as the officially recognized successor state of the Soviet Union it inherited its state 
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institutions.1 A majority of the political elite had emerged within the Communist 
Party, but many changed their ideology in the wake of democratization. The liberal 
elite, led by Boris Yeltsin, was enormously popular in the early stages, but his 
government faced problems in the implementation stage of its policies. A test of the 
strength of Russian democratization came in 1993, when conflicts between different 
institutions surfaced. The chaotic manner in which the democratization process took 
place in Russia laid the ground for extreme views to be voiced, and by 1994 Yeltsin 
had developed his policies in a more patriotic direction. 
Chechnya-Ingushetia was an autonomous republic within the RSFSR. None of the 
entities at this administrative level have, so far, become de jure sovereign states. 
Chechnya and Ingushetia did, however, split in two separate entities after 1991, and 
Chechen demands for autonomy were made independently of the Ingush. A number 
of explanations have been suggested to explain Chechnya’s strive for independence, 
such as experiences of suppression by the Russians before and during Soviet times, 
cultural explanations and the local elite’s desire to benefit from oil revenues. 
However, I am not primarily trying to explain why they seek independence, but to 
explain how their struggle led to a violent conflict. Nationalist forces became 
extremely powerful in the wake of democratization. This was facilitated by the fact 
that the Soviet system granted territorial autonomy to ethnic groups, which made it 
possible for a new elite to declare independence. The state building process stagnated 
quickly however, and internal rivalries dominated the immediate period before the 
war broke out. When Russia invaded in 1994, the Chechen groups united against 
their common enemy. 
It is a question of definition whether to call the Russo-Chechen war a civil war. Some 
would say that since Chechnya had declared itself independent, the war was between 
two sovereign states. Chechnya did, however, lack a number of the formal 
prerequisites of a state, such as a functioning state apparatus and external recognition. 
 
1 The Russian Federation (RF) and Russia are both official names for the Russian state, and are used interchangeably in the 
literature. In this thesis Russia will be used. 
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Thus it seems reasonable to label the war a civil war. Regardless of this distinction, 
Snyder’s theory can be used on both international and civil wars. 
This thesis demonstrates that the democratization process had a similar impact on 
Chechnya and Russia. The institutions were weak, and were subject to manipulation 
by power holders. The competition for power became intense, and to some degree 
anarchic. This increased on both sides the likelihood to take to arms, and both sides 
needed an enemy to mobilize against. Nationalist rhetoric was used to different 
degrees in Russia and Chechnya, but nationalism played a role both places. The 
democratization process thus led both parties to a situation when war became 
expedient. 
1.3 Methodology 
This is an intensive, in-depth investigation of the two parties of the Russo-Chechen 
war. The internal development on each side is essential to understand the concrete 
impact of the democratization process. As this study addresses the issue of how a 
certain process affected decision making patterns, the case study approach is useful. 
Robert Yin (2003: 13) terms a case study as the following:  
“An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident”.  
In a case study it is advantageous to operate with a small number of units. This 
method is useful when asking how and why questions, which deal with operational 
links, needing to be traced over time, rather than frequencies or incidences. The case 
under scrutiny here consists of two main units, the two parties of the Russo-Chechen 
war, and the investigation focuses on how events relate to one another in the 
development towards the outbreak of war. In the analysis I argue that there are 
specific links between a process and a certain outcome. The issue of internal validity, 
whether inferences made that one event resulted from another event are correct, is 
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thus important to be aware of (Yin, 2003: 36). By concretely stating the objectives of 
my inquiry, the type of information I am looking for, and how I seek to analyze it, I 
have clarified the procedures for making such inferences. The reader will thus be able 
to link the analysis with the evidence presented. This procedure can also allow for 
reliability – that a later investigator can follow the same procedures and conduct the 
same case study, and thereby make the same findings and conclusions. In the 
procedures used in the analysis, I link events and make assumptions on the causality 
in work. The complexity of history is important to be aware of. I borrow some tools 
from historical explanation and process-tracing: 
“The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the 
causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) 
and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett, 2005: 206) 
A methodological problem arising is that variables excluded from the analysis might 
have an impact on the outcome as well. It may be difficult to eliminate all potential 
rival explanations, especially where human agents are involved (George and Bennett, 
2005: 207). Yin (2003) emphasizes that replication of the findings in further case 
study is necessary in order to generalize to similar cases. The potential for 
generalization is thus limited when using a case study and in this analysis I will not 
attempt to make conclusions on the behalf of all similar cases. The results can lead to 
analytical generalization, and a modification of the theory. The findings can in turn 
be applied in later investigations of similar cases. The explanatory power of a theory 
is always limited, and the theory used here also has its weaknesses. Case studies 
employing process-tracing can play an important role in development of theories 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 209).  
Sources 
In this thesis I bring together different empirical accounts of the case, and extract 
aspects which are relevant for the research question. New data has not been collected. 
Instead, in an attempt to develop a new understanding of the material, existing 
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material has been analyzed using an alternative perspective to that used by previous 
investigators. Various types of sources have been used – academic books and articles, 
newspapers and internet sources, journalistic accounts and memoirs, most of which 
are secondary ones. A number of problems can be connected with the use of sources 
and the collection of evidence. How one chooses to present the empirical evidence is 
primarily a question of interpretation, as it is impossible to include a complete 
representation of reality. Nevertheless it is crucial that the evidence presented is 
correct (Dahl, 1973). When using a source, one must consider its applicability to 
describe the event in question, which depends on its closeness to the event and its 
reliability. Some degree of caution must be applied when dealing with the 
interpretations of the events in the sources. This is for example the case with Valery 
Tishkov, a well-respected scholar, but also a former member of Yeltsin’s 
government. On the one hand his account can give detailed inside information; on the 
other hand it is likely to be colored by the opinions of the writer, and the angle from 
which he witnessed the events. It is important to verify information when using such 
type of source, by double checking the information given in other sources, and 
leaving out personal viewpoints made by the author. I have chosen to focus primarily 
on secondary sources, which give detailed and varied information about the 
development. This approach is sufficient to give a fruitful analysis of the case. Many 
books and articles are written on the subject, and I have made a choice of which to 
include here. Many of the sources used are frequently referred to in scholarly work, 
which adds to their credibility. My approach would probably not have been radically 
different if I had included other sources as well. 
1.4 Transcription 
English sources are not consistent with one another in the way Russian and Chechen 
names and words are transcribed. For the sake of consistency the spelling in this 
thesis can differ from the spelling in some of the sources. There is especially a huge 
variety in the way Chechen names are spelled, probably because in some sources they 
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are translated through Russian and in others directly from Chechen.  Russian names 
are more consistently translated, but also here the spelling differs from one source to 
another. I have chosen to translate Russian “e” into “ye”, thus I write Yeltsin, not 
‘Eltsin and Dudayev, not Dudaev. The Russian “ий”-ending is translated into “y”, 
thus I write Zhirinovsky, not Zhirinovskii.   
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis has six chapters, including this first introductory chapter. In chapter two, I 
give a more detailed presentation of the theory applied. First, a conceptual 
clarification of democratization and some related concepts is presented in 2.1, 
followed by a brief description of the background of the theory, in 2.2. In 2.3, I 
present Snyder’s theory and some critiques of it, and assess whether they are relevant 
here. This presentation is divided into three parts – institutional development in 2.3.1, 
elite competition in 2.3.2 and nationalist mobilization in 2.3.3. These parts define 
what I will look for in the subsequent analysis. 
In chapter three, the historical background is presented. First, I describe the historical 
relationship between the two parties of the conflict in 3.1, and then I outline the main 
reasons for the break up of the Soviet Union in 3.2.  
In chapter four and five, the theoretical framework will be used to examine 
developments on both sides of the conflict. The analysis is thus divided in two 
chapters, chapter four emphasizes the Russian side, and chapter five emphasizes the 
Chechen side. Both these chapters have subsections regarding institutional 
development, elite competition, nationalist mobilization, and finally a discussion of 
the findings on each side.  
Chapter six concludes the thesis. In 6.1, I summarize and discuss the findings from 
chapter four and five. I compare the two sides and assess the application of Snyder’s 
theory to this particular case, and point to theoretical weaknesses. In 6.2, I point to 
some implications this study has for the case, and discuss whether a violent conflict 
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could have been avoided. Finally, in 6.2, I discuss the implications the results of this 
study have for future democratization processes. 
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2. Theory 
2.1 Defining democratization 
The process of democratization is a central concept in this thesis. Democratization 
refers to a process of transition from some kind of regime other than democracy 
towards democracy (Snyder, 2000: 25). A regime can be said to be the informal or 
formal procedures which determine access to governmental power, and how 
decisions are made in a state. There are variations between different types of regimes 
as to which actors are to be involved in these procedures. Some sort of 
institutionalization must necessarily be present, so that the procedures are known and 
practiced (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 73). It is important not to confuse the term 
democratization with democracy, which refers to an established regime type. 
Democracy is a contested concept, measured in different ways by different scholars. 
A seminal contribution to democracy theory is given by Robert Dahl (1971). He 
emphasizes the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its 
citizens, considered as political equals. His basic criteria are “political participation” 
and “contestation”, defined by a number of liberties. In Dahl’s model, both criteria 
fall along a continuum. In his view, democracy is an ideal type against which all 
political systems can be measured. At the other end of the scale we find 
dictatorships.2   
 
2 How to measure the level of democracy is a subject of discussion. While some, like Dahl and the often used 
Freedom House index (http://www.freedomhouse.org/) apply a gradual measure of democracy, others prefer a 
dichotomous measure. A gradual measure can reflect the development a regime goes through over time, but the 
proponents of a dichotomous measure argue that a regime cannot be “half-democratic”. According to the 
dichotomous measure, a regime is either democratic or not, and it is not possible to grade types of democracy. 
Sartori, for example, sees systems as bounded wholes characterized by constitutive mechanisms and principles 
that are either present or absent. First a regime must be classified democracy or non-democracy. Then as a 
second step, a further set of criteria can be applied to those regimes deemed democratic by the initial 
dichotomy (Adcock and Collier, 1999: 541-545)  
  10
                                             
In his model Dahl shows that the political regime is not a constant feature, but has 
potential to change in various directions. By using Dahl’s definition of democracy, 
we can label a state democratizing if it has adopted one or more democratic 
characteristics.3 Jack Snyder gives a similar, but more detailed definition of 
democracy, which fits with Dahl’s gradual measure of democracy. He labels states 
democratizing if they have recently adopted one or more of these democratic 
characteristics, even if they retain important non-democratic features:  
“In mature democracies, government policy, including foreign and military policy, is 
made by officials chosen through free, fair and periodic elections in which a 
substantial proportion of the adult population can vote; the actions of officials are 
constrained by constitutional provisions and commitments to civil liberties; and 
government candidates sometimes lose elections and leave office when they do. 
Freedom of speech, freedom to organize groups to contest elections, and reasonably 
equitable representation of varied viewpoints in the media are presumed to be 
preconditions for a free and fair election” (Snyder, 2000: 26). 
Democratization thus refers to a number of processes which are supposed to stimulate 
change in a democratic direction, by introducing institutions and practices which can 
make both the regime and the society as a whole reflect democratic values. 
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 8) define democratization as “The processes 
whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political 
institutions previously governed by other principles, or expanded to include persons 
not previously enjoying such rights and obligations, or extended to cover issues and 
institutions not previously subject to citizen participation.” During the transition rules 
are in constant flux, and usually contested by different actors seeking to defend both 
their immediate interests, and their ability to define the rules for future political 
competition. The changes during a democratization process can roughly be divided in 
 
3 Rule of law is usually another trait ususally emphasized in a definition of democracy. Richard Rose and Neil 
Munro (2002: 42) argue that “A completely democratic state must meet two conditions: it must be a modern, 
rule-of-law state and the government must be chosen by free elections”. 
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two main features – one being that new political institutions are put in place, and the 
other being that society opens up. Combined, these changes give each individual an 
increased opportunity to have a say in political decision-making. 
The term autocracy or dictatorship is often used as a residual category. A regime 
where only a marginal part of the population is involved in the political game, and the 
majority must accept the decisions made by the political elite, can be labeled 
autocratic. The population is often prevented, by law or other measures, from 
engaging in activities challenging the power holders. This is consistent with the 
definition used by Snyder and Mansfield: 
“In an autocracy, state authorities are accountable only to themselves, or at most a 
group of elites that maintain unity when dealing with outsiders. No significant 
political activity – in particular, no contestation for power – is allowed outside the 
ruling group”(Snyder and Mansfield, 2005: 40). 
The diffuse space between a full democracy and a full dictatorship is in scholarly 
work often occupied by a “mixed regime”, an “anocracy” or a “semi-democracy”. 
These are regimes that are in the midst of a democratization or autocratization process 
and have stagnated on the way, or who fail to fulfill the basic criteria of a democracy. 
Political competition falls short of full democracy, because of restrictions on who can 
participate, how they can participate, or what issues they can raise. The vast majority 
of mixed regimes hold elections of some kind, although they fall short of the fully 
democratic standard of competitive and fair elections (Snyder and Mansfield, 2005: 
41). 
Richard Sakwa (1993: 25) discusses whether the term “democratization” is 
appropriate to use on the Russian case, and argues that the “whole notion of 
‘transition’ has a somewhat deterministic air, suggesting that the destination is known 
and that the transition from communism to democracy is inevitable. Just because the 
actors themselves insist that the goal is democracy is no reason why we should accept 
that at face value, though it might be part of the truth”. He suggests the term 
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“modernization”  or “creating a new political order” to be more appropriate. To some 
extent, Sakwa has a point in saying that the term might be misinterpreted by some as 
a process that must lead to democracy. For analytical purposes, however, the term 
covers the institutional and political changes in Russia in a suitable way, without 
claiming that these processes automatically lead to a democracy. Democratization is 
not understood here, or in most other scholarly work, as an irreversible process. It 
does not necessarily lead to a consolidated democracy. A democratizing state can fall 
back into autocracy, or stay a semi-democracy for a long period of time. The analysis 
later in this thesis will demonstrate why it must be legitimate to claim that Russia, in 
the period under discussion, was democratizing according to the above-mentioned 
definition. 
2.2 Democratic peace theory 
Jack Snyder developed his theory as a response to a growing body of literature 
known as the democratic peace theory.4 This theory proposes that democracies are 
less likely to fight wars than other types of regimes, and that they rarely, if ever, go to 
war with each other. The theory draws heavily on Immanuel Kant’s influential work 
”Perpetual Peace” from 1795, where he introduced the idea that democracies have a 
more peaceful conduct, both internally and externally, than autocracies (Doyle, 1997: 
251). A basic prerequisite for world peace is thus, in Kant’s theory, that more 
countries adopt democratic forms of governance. Two main explanations are given 
for why consolidated democracies have a more peaceful conduct. One is a structural 
explanation, which emphasizes how leaders are constrained by the population in their 
decision making. Citizens have institutional means to constrain political leaders 
through the ballot box, and political leaders can be removed from office. This adds 
costs to a decision to wage a war, and makes democracies supposedly more reluctant 
to start wars. The other is a normative explanation, with emphasis on cultural aspects 
 
4 The democratic peace theory is also referred to as the liberal peace thesis in the literature. 
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and the link to liberalism. Democracies simply do not want to go to war (Ray, 1995: 
91). 
In recent years, scholars have produced a number of arguments and empirical 
evidence for the connection between regime type and the likelihood of war, and 
research have been conducted at different levels.5 Michael Doyle (1997) supports the 
idea put forward by Kant, and argues that democratic states have created a “separate 
peace” – they do not fight wars against other democracies. Yet, he argues, they are 
not less prone to fight wars against autocracies. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett (1993) 
also find, in exploring the dyadic level, that “democracy, in and of itself has a 
consistent and robust negative effect on the likelihood of conflict”.  
The body of research on this theory has created a degree of consensus, at least within 
academic circles, about the potential democracy has to stabilize peace when 
democracies are dealing with one another. It is more difficult to say what kind of 
effect the initial stages of democratization can have on the likelihood of war in a 
country. If it is the case, as Jack Snyder proposes, that the democratization process in 
fact increases the risk of war, the consequence of multiple transitions could be fatal. It 
is necessary to investigate which dangers democratization processes can involve, and 
how they can be better managed. Otherwise we might risk jeopardizing international 
security. 
2.3 Democratization and war 
Jack Snyder developed his theory as a response to the growing belief in democracy, 
and by extension also democratization, as a remedy against warfare. 6 Instead, he 
 
5 The different levels are the dyadic, which is between pairs of states; systemic, which is within a network of states; and 
internal, which is within one state. The focus has been on the systemic and dyadic levels, not so much on the internal level. 
This is probably because the theory has been used mainly in studies of international relations. 
6 Jack Snyder has cooperated with other theorists on developing the theory, such as Karen Ballentine (See Snyder and 
Ballentine, 1996) and Edward Mansfield (See Snyder and Mansfield, 1995; Snyder and Mansfield, 2002; Snyder and 
Mansfield, 2005). These should also be credited for their contributions. For the sake of simplicity, however, the theory will 
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claimed that democratization, if it is carried out in a poor manner, can have the 
opposite effect on the likelihood of war. His theory was initially developed to show 
that democratizing states are prone to take part in international wars, but the theory 
went on to include civil wars as well. He argues that democratizing states are more 
likely to experience civil wars than are both democracies and autocracies. Snyder is 
not the only one who has put forward such a claim.  
Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) argue that democratization initially leads to an increasing 
conflict level, and only leads to peace in the long run. Harshly authoritarian states and 
institutionally consistent democracies experience fewer civil wars than intermediate 
regimes, which possess inherent contradictions as a result of being neither democratic 
nor autocratic. This is also shown in research by for example de Nardo (1985), 
Francisco (1995) and Mueller and Weede (1990). Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and 
Gleditsch  (2001) argue that regimes in change are more prone to violence than both 
stable democracies and stable autocracies. Political change deconsolidates political 
institutions and heightens the risk of civil war, as discussed for example by Sahin and 
Linz (1995) and Tarrow (1994). The conflict-preventing effect of democratic 
institutions is often explained by trust in the system. One problem is that a stable 
democracy also requires a certain level of support for political and societal 
institutions and their leaders (Steen, 2003: 25). When the institutions are weakly 
developed, such a support is difficult to find, and the conflict-preventing effect 
disappears. Samuel Huntington (1991) finds that political violence often occurs 
during democratization processes. While some of these theories point to the danger of 
societal unrest and violence in general, Jack Snyder explores one particular ideology 
which might be sparked by the democratization process, namely nationalism. 
Snyder argues that when the regime goes through fundamental changes, it is more 
vulnerable to pressure from certain groups in society, and lacks institutions to deal 
with a number of crises that might arise. One potential consequence of the 
be referred to as Snyder’s theory in the following. This is also because Snyder has had a leading position in the 
development of the theory. 
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democratization process is that it leaves room for the political elite to take advantage 
of nationalist sentiments in the population in order to gain support and secure their 
own powerbase. Snyder’s theory can help us to understand how war can erupt in a 
democratizing state, by showing how interests are more likely to confront in a violent 
way. The theory does not, however, attempt to explain the underlying reasons behind 
those interests. Instead it claims that institutional prerequisites for conflict are more 
important than explanations such as historical grievances or cultural traits. Later we 
will see how Snyder’s theory in this regard contradicts some common assumptions 
about the Russo-Chechen conflict.  
Some criticism has been raised towards Snyder’s theory, especially its early versions 
(See Snyder and Mansfield, 1995). The main body of criticism is, however, directed 
against the statistics used in developing and testing the theory, and not necessarily 
against the theory as such (See for example Braumoeller, 1997; Thompson and 
Tucker, 1997; Wolf, et al., 1996). These will thus not be addressed in this thesis. 
Snyder’s theory presents a model where several factors work together to increase the 
risk of conflict. I have chosen to present the theory on the basis of what I see as the 
three main factors contained in the model – the institutional development, elite 
competition, and nationalist mobilization. These three aspects are not independent of 
each other. It is necessary to see them as parts of a dynamic model, they are 
mechanisms working together to form the circumstances described in Snyder’s 
theory. Combined, they can serve to increase the conflict potential of a 
democratization process, if taken negatively advantage of by different actors in the 
process. While another student of Snyder’s theory might choose to describe the 
theory in another manner, and emphasize other aspects than what is done here, this 
does not mean that any of our interpretations of the theory lack consistence with the 
theory itself. It would simply demonstrate that there are numerous ways of applying 
one single theory.  
Below the theoretical assumptions are presented. First the institutional development, 
second elite competition and third the nationalist mobilization. In the next two 
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chapters the theory is applied to the Russian side and the Chechen side in order to 
analyze how the two parties were influenced by these three aspects of the 
democratization process when they made the decision to go to war. This can help 
evaluate whether the theory gives a fruitful explanation of the outbreak of this 
particular war.  
2.3.1 Institutional development 
A democratization process entails the introduction of new institutions such as 
elections and political parties, and major changes in existing ones such as the power 
of the military and the judiciary. Institutions are patterns of repeated, conventional 
behavior around which expectations converge (Snyder, 2000: 48). 
“Strong institutions shape expectations and behavior with a high degree of 
predictability: people know that almost everyone else will conform to the expected 
pattern and consequently that failure to conform will make it harder to accomplish 
tasks that require coordination with others. Weak institutions, in contrast, have not 
become ingrained habits: people know that others may not conform. This does little 
to shape expectations and regulate behavior” (Snyder and Mansfield, 2005: 44).  
The problem with weak institutions is, on the one hand, that they take time to 
establish, but more dangerously that they allow for exploitation. The functioning of 
institutions is also a collective action problem, because institutions loose their 
meaning if they are not being utilized they way they are supposed to. New democratic 
institutions are in the beginning probably not powerful enough to replace centralized 
coercive institutions of the previous regime, each group is primarily concerned with 
making sure that its own interests are served. This way, no one has sufficient power 
or motive to look out for the coherence of the overall policy outcome . An incomplete 
democratization process in a context of weak institutions gives the elite an incentive 
to use the situation for personal achievements (Snyder and Mansfield, 2005: 55-57). 
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It necessarily takes time for institutions to establish themselves and become a 
permanent feature of the system, but in transitional states the public often anticipates 
the results of the democratization process with anxiety. Demands for fast changes are 
made which might be impossible to fulfill, instead causing the authorities to make 
hasty decisions to satisfy the population. The development of media and a 
competitive environment of mass communication can also create opportunities for 
successful nationalist persuasion in democratizing states (Snyder, 2000: 55). The gap 
between rising demands for mass participation and the declining ability of political 
institutions to settle the conflicts of interest that this entails is a fundamental problem 
of societies undergoing incomplete democratization in a context of weak 
governmental institutions (Snyder and Mansfield, 2005: 59). This leads to an 
institutional gap. The impatience to see change can not be met by decisive action if 
institutions are not present to absorb the demands of the population.   
The order in which the institutions are introduced is also critical. The ideal path of 
development is one where the government is institutionalized, with clear divisions of 
power between different branches, before elections are held.  If mass suffrage 
elections are held too early, before proper and stable political parties are made, and 
before checks on the freedom of speech are developed, the result can be fatal. Both 
Robert Dahl and Samuel Huntington pointed out that democratic transitions are most 
successful when strong political institutions are developed before popular 
participation increases. In general, the idea of sequences has been rather marginal in 
democratization theory, but Snyder argues that sequence is important (Snyder and 
Mansfield, 2005: 3-4). Dankwart Rustow (1970) was the first to emphasize this. He 
criticized the approaches to democratization in the 1970s, which focused mainly on 
the prerequisites of democracy – such as wealth, literacy and a large middle class. In 
contrast, Rustow argued that the stability of democratic consolidation depends on the 
sequence in which the requisites appear.  
Erik Nordlinger (1968) follows the same line of argumentation. He proposes a four-
stage process where a national identity ideally should come before a central 
government is institutionalized, parties are introduced and elections are held. If an 
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attempt is made to accomplish this in a rapid fashion, the outcome is likely to be 
widespread violence and repressive rule, making it difficult to establish a stable 
democratic system. Early introduction of mass suffrage has usually resulted from 
populist rhetoric, stimulating high expectations for popular influence upon 
governmental decisions (Nordlinger, 1968: 498-518). Stabilizing governmental 
structures before party competition and mass suffrage are introduced can on the other 
hand dampen the intensity of partisan conflicts, because they are then channeled 
through and processed by the mediating governmental institutions.  
An ideal democratization process begins, according to Snyder, with the state’s 
construction of an orderly administrative powerbase, followed by development of the 
rule of law and institutions of public debate. The first two steps should be completed 
before the state can incorporate conflicting demands by the public in an effective 
manner (Snyder and Mansfield, 2005: 59). Because such a process develops at 
different levels and cannot be planned in detail, it is of limited use to speak of an 
“ideal”, but it can help reveal how different aspects of the process actually depend on 
one another. Democratic elections are supposed to reduce the conflict level in society 
by allowing all voices to have a say in the political process, but when important 
prerequisites for democracy are missing, the election can instead become an arena for 
mobilization of hate. Snyder argues that elections should not be introduced too early 
in a transitional process. This is contrary to a somewhat established popular 
conviction that a country can move from autocracy to democracy in a short period of 
time, if only it manages to hold “free and fair” elections. It is doubtful whether one 
election can achieve a complete system change, especially if other democratic 
institutions are missing. The context in which elections are held is therefore central 
when assessing whether or not the first elections are premature. 
Another aspect related to the institutionalization of a new regime, is the development 
of a more open media environment and a growth in channels through which the 
freedom of speech can be exercised, both by politicians and the population. The 
success or failure of the elite’s attempts at persuasion is strongly influenced by the 
structure of the marketplace of ideas. This is defined by Snyder and Ballentine (1996) 
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in terms of partial monopolies of supply of political information, the segmentation of 
demand, and the strength of institutions that scrutinize and integrate public debate. 
They warn against giving full press freedom in initial phases of democratization, 
arguing that promoting unconditional freedom of public debate in newly 
democratizing societies is likely to make the problem of nationalist conflict worse. It 
can allow populist mythmakers to take control of the public discourse, which can 
serve to strengthen nationalist attitudes in the population. When there are no control 
mechanisms on the media, nationalist myths are more likely to be fuelled than 
refuted, which can contribute to environment of escalating mythmaking (Snyder and 
Ballentine, 1996: 54-57).  
Snyder and Ballentine also claim that a “partial monopoly” of the marketplace of 
ideas, which often occurs during the earliest stages of democratization, may be as bad 
as a perfect monopoly, if not worse (Snyder and Ballentine, 1996: 14-15). When 
there is a lack of institutions to control hate speech and false accusations in media, it 
can lead to dangerous confrontations. In autocratic regimes, where the leaders have 
full control over media, the public tends to be skeptical about the ideas that are 
presented in the press, but when the marketplace of ideas is released, it is more 
difficult to know which sources to trust. That way the newly freed press can become 
a vehicle for nationalist appeals. Both the old and new elites are typically reluctant to 
allow full democratization, since this might pose a threat to their access to power.  
The success of the democratization process can be judged by how smooth 
institutional changes are made, and what role the institutions come to play in the 
everyday functioning of the state. There are, however, problems attached to the 
building of a new institutional environment, the challenge often being that the 
institutions are weak, and consequently develop in a less fruitful, and perhaps even 
destructive, direction. This is particularly the case in states where state institutions 
were weak to begin with, and where they are open to manipulation by power holders. 
Another problem, according to Snyder, is that elites in transitional societies usually 
see the weakness of democratic institutions more as an opportunity than as a danger. 
If they can get a message through to the public that democratic institutions are 
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unpredictable and unreliable, they will do so because it can secure their own 
powerbase (Snyder, 2000: 55). When powerful groups feel threatened by democracy, 
they seek to keep their states’ institutions weak and vulnerable to manipulation. The 
problem of institutional weakness can thus be strongly related to the issue of 
opportunistic elites (Snyder and Mansfield, 2005: 59). Elites in opposition can also 
exploit the weakness of the institutions, and thereby intensify and possibly make the 
competition with the established elite more violent.  
In sum, Snyder claims that weak institutions are dangerous because they limit the 
ability of society to resolve conflicts that arise. Lack of institutional constraints on the 
power holders can cause problems if the institutions are weak. The institutions are left 
open for manipulation for political gains, and remain weak if elites prevent them from 
becoming permanent features of the regime. If democratic institutions are introduced 
in the wrong order, this can lead to a destabilized political environment. Mass 
suffrage and elections should not come before the central government is established. 
If the marketplace of ideas is opened too early, it can serve as a vehicle for 
mobilization of hate due to the lack of control mechanisms. 
In the analysis I will thus trace how and when democratic institutions were 
introduced, and evaluate to what extent these institutions were strong or weak. I will 
discuss whether the order of institutionalization influenced their strength, and how 
different elites took advantage of institutional weaknesses. I will also look at how the 
marketplace of ideas developed, and whether it was taken advantage of for political 
purposes.   
2.3.2 Elite competition 
When the regime in a country undergoes changes in a more democratic direction, its 
leadership and powerful position holders or people with access to these positions 
must adjust to new ways of acquiring influence. The power holders face a situation 
where they loose influence and power, while new opportunities arise for alternative 
elites to gain power. The population can exercise more influence on political 
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processes though voting, while the burden of giving up or sharing power is usually 
placed on the elite. In Snyder’s theory the diminishing influence of the elite is a 
central factor which might lead to instability. The old elite tries to hold on to power, 
and new elites are given an opportunity to fight for influence, while the rules of the 
game are not yet defined. A chaotic situation can emerge, where different elites 
compete desperately to win the hearts and minds of the voters in order to secure 
powerful positions. 
Elites influence political decision-making processes in some way, either directly or 
indirectly. They differ from the population as a whole by being able to define 
premises and make decisions, and by potentially influencing political outcomes 
(Steen, 2003: 17). The concept of elite can take on a number of different meanings, 
depending on the context. This thesis is concerned with the political elite, and more 
specifically the ruling group in a society, consisting of the people who take decisions 
of countrywide significance (Kryshtanovskaya and White, 1996: 712). According to 
Snyder, elites do, to different extents, feel threatened by the introduction of 
democratic institutions. This is because it challenges their traditional hold on power, 
and for this power to remain through the first turbulent stage of voter mobilization, 
the elites need to play their cards right. When the rules of the game change, they need 
to adapt in order to avoid giving away power to those who play the game better than 
themselves.  
Elites have several ideological options for making their appeals to a newly awakened 
mass public. One is liberalism, but according to Snyder few elites in newly 
democratizing, poorly institutionalized states are likely to find this option attractive, 
because it is based on true accountability to the average voter. This means that they 
risk loosing power if it turns out the public do not want them in that position. Another 
option is to appeal to the class interests of the voters, or even more useful; to cross-
class values or interests such as religion or nationalism (Snyder and Mansfield, 2005: 
61). To the extent that the elite actually manages to benefit from nationalism, it often 
keeps a partial control over powerful governmental, economic, and media resources, 
despite the rise in mass politics. This is also due to the weak institutional framework. 
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Institutions governing public debate are often too weak to check the influence of 
nationalist mythmakers, and the elites can take advantage of this (Snyder, 2000: 54).  
When elites feel threatened, they become desperate to gather support, and try to 
convince the population to follow their political direction. This is because elites in a 
democratization process have a much narrower room for maneuver when it comes to 
using different kinds of power than in an autocratic regime. They can, however, take 
advantage of weak institutions to exercise the distinct type of power that they want. 
Old means of legitimating elite rule are no longer valid, and instruments of repression 
and patronage become harder to exercise effectively. Infrastructural power, especially 
the power of liberal democratic institutions, is likely to be limited: efficiency and 
fairness in public administration, professional journalism, and political parties, as 
well as the rule of law, are likely to be in short supply (Snyder and Mansfield, 2005: 
54). The lack of functioning institutions can thus be of some assistance to the elites in 
their attempts to mobilize support.  
Snyder claims that the path of the transition is influenced by the degree of threat to 
elite interests and the strength of political institutions in the beginning of that process. 
The subsequent trajectory is further shaped by the strategies that political actors adopt 
in the course of the transition, including the coalitions they form, the rules they 
institutionalize, and the ideologies they promote (Snyder and Mansfield, 2005: 45). 
The first problem nationalist elites face is to create the possibility of effective 
collective action on a national scale (Snyder, 2000: 51). A democratization process 
takes place at different levels simultaneously, and is impossible to control. Promoting 
a common identity can help the elite in overcoming collective action-problems, 
which are common in democratization processes. In the next part we will see how, 
and under which circumstances, nationalism can be used in this process. 
In sum, Snyder argues that in a democratization process the elite in power needs to 
attract support because it feels threatened. Simultaneously alternative elites gain new 
opportunities to take power. Both old and new elites will attempt to find an ideology 
which can be used effectively for mobilization of support, and nationalism can prove 
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useful for this purpose. Elites can also take advantage of weak institutions to gain 
access to powerful positions. Harsh competition between elites, in an environment 
where the rules of the game are unclear, can lead to conflict. 
In the analysis I will thus investigate how the democratization process influenced the 
manner in which elites behaved, and how divisions between different elites 
materialized. I will examine to what extent members of the old elite were threatened 
by the democratization process, how they expressed fear of losing power, and what 
measures they employed to hold on to power. I will also look at how new elites 
maneuvered to access power, and to what extent different elites resorted to nationalist 
rhetoric.  
2.3.3 Nationalist mobilization 
According to Snyder nationalism is an ideology with great appeal for elites in 
democratizing states. This is because they can mobilize mass support through the 
language of popular sovereignty – rule in the name of the people, without needing the 
accountability that would be provided by free and fair elections and the rule of law 
(Snyder and Mansfield, 2005: 39). It also offers a built-in justification for restricting 
the rights of potential opponents.  
Nationalism can be adapted to justify the political exclusion of almost any type of 
group, since it can present almost any contender as a threat against national unity, 
which is a powerful claim (Snyder, 2000: 52). Both rising new elites and falling old 
elites have the motive and the opportunity to resort to the rhetoric of nationalism. 
This can create a spiral of competition, where the winner is the one using the most 
convincing nationalistic rhetoric. The strength of the national identity also determines 
how actively the elite can use this ideology, but according to Snyder the 
democratization process in itself can also shape the content of the national identity. 
Before proceeding, I will define more specifically the concepts nation and 
nationalism. Through history, the concept of nation has been attributed various 
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meanings, for example the population of a state or a group of people with common 
cultural traits (Østerud, 1994: 15-22). Anthony Smith (2001: 13) defines the nation as  
”A named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and 
a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and 
duties for all members”. As pointed out by Benedict Anderson (2006), nations are in 
a sense imagined communities, as it is impossible for all members to have contact 
with each other. Nations have a subjective and an objective identity – meaning that 
the members must identify themselves within the nation, and that there are some 
objective criteria, such as language, religion and history, to use for identification. 
Smith (2001: 9) writes that nationalism is an ideological movement for attaining and 
maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its 
members deem to constitute an actual or potential “nation”. Nationalism takes the 
existence of the nation for granted, and presupposes that the world is divided into 
nations, that the nation is the sole source for political power and that loyalty to the 
nation overrides all other loyalties (Smith, 2001: 22). This ideology developed in 
Europe in the eighteenth century. According to Ernest Gellner (1998), the idea of the 
nation developed out of necessity when the industrial revolution changed the 
relationship between individuals and the state from a passive one to a more active 
one. While Gellner claims that nations were “built” around existing administrative 
structures, Smith sees a link between the development of nations and pre-modern 
ethnic identities.  
Snyder’s point of view is that the type of nationalism that causes conflict is not only 
divisive; it is shaped to a large extent by the democratization process through what he 
calls “elite persuasion”. Yet, elites cannot simply generate nationalist sentiments 
without some kind of national identity already present.  
“Democratization produces nationalism when powerful groups within the nation not 
only need to harness popular energies to the tasks of war and economic development, 
but they also want to avoid surrendering real political authority to the average citizen. 
Nationalist conflict arise as a by-product of elites efforts to persuade the people to 
accept divisive nationalist ideas” (Snyder, 2000: 32) 
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Snyder contrasts his “elite persuasion” perspective on national mobilization with 
what he calls the “popular rivalries” view. In this view, popular nationalist rivalries 
precede democratization, which in due course gives expression to long-held, popular 
aspirations of an already-formed nation. The popular-rivalries theory holds that the 
best predictors of the intensity of nationalist conflict during democratization are a 
history of violence between the national groups and an ethnically intermingled 
demographic pattern (Snyder, 2000: 85). Snyder argues that this view is not valid, by 
saying that “nations are not simply freed or awakened by democratization; they are 
formed by the experiences they undergo during that process” (Snyder, 2000: 31-36). 
He claims that most of the contemporary conflicts in the world are not due to ancient 
cultural hatreds. In some cases, the warring groups had experienced no armed conflict 
until relatively recently (Snyder, 2000: 18). He also emphasizes that mass nationalism 
seldom is well developed before democratization. More commonly, it rises during the 
earliest phase of democratic change. “In the era before the majority of the population 
takes an active part in political life, their sense of belonging to a nation is usually 
weak” (Snyder, 2000: 35).  
David Byman and Stephen Van Evera (1998; 1994) offer an alternative to Snyder’s 
position. According to them, nations that perceive their existence to be threatened can 
choose to go to war regardless of regime, but a regime change can trigger the 
mechanisms that lead nationalism to become malignant – and duly violent.  The risk 
posed by nationalism depends on whether it is benign and peaceful, or malign and 
violent, and whether the demands of the group are satisfied or not (Van Evera, 1994: 
7-9). They thus see the effect of nationalism as independent of the effect of 
democratization. The democratization process as such does not generate nationalist 
sentiments, but can contribute to their entrance into the public debate. They 
emphasize an essentialist view on nationality, which is more similar to Smith’s 
understanding of the nation, and in line with what Snyder labels the “popular 
rivalries”-explanation. It presupposes set identities that are clashing against one 
another in the wake of political freedoms. Democratization is particularly problematic 
in societies where many ethnicities compete for power, and a solution can be to give 
  26
minorities assurances to avoid an internal security dilemma. This is directly opposite 
to the solution proposed by Snyder:  
 “The popular-rivalries theory prescribes power sharing schemes or ethnic partitions 
as means of disentangling rival ethnic groups, whereas my theory warns that such 
putative remedies might needlessly lock in inimical ethnic identities. However, these 
two approaches do agree on one prescription: it is dangerous to unleash 
democratization before effective antidotes to nationalist conflict are in place” (Snyder 
2000: 85). 
The type of nationalism that emerges during democratization depends, according to 
Snyder, primarily on the level and timing of economic development, the adaptability 
of elite interests, and the strength of the country’s political and administrative 
institutions. His claim is that these correlations are not simply side effects of 
economic or strategic factors. These outcomes depend on both the motivation and the 
opportunity of elites to promote nationalist doctrines (Snyder, 2000: 37). The elite 
can appeal to different types of nationalism; some are more divisive than others. A 
civic form of nationalism is a less divisive type, but also more difficult to mobilize 
voters around. The most extreme type is ethnic nationalism, and elites use this when 
they feel particularly vulnerable (Snyder, 2000: 71). The appeals are often based on 
untruths or exaggerations, propounded by self-interested groups that aim to derive 
private benefits from the fruits of public cooperation (Snyder, 2000: 53). This can 
lead to violent clashes. 
“To mobilize support, nationalists often portray other nations as more threatening, 
more implacable, more culpable for historic wrongs, yet also more easily countered 
by resolute opposition than they really are” (Snyder, 2000: 67).   
In sum, Snyder argues that elites often resort to nationalist rhetoric in a 
democratization process - especially when they feel threatened. Both old and new 
elites  have an incentive to use nationalism when mobilizing for support. This type of 
rhetoric can be very effective and thus help them to gain access to powerful positions 
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in competition with other elites. This can lead to conflict. However, nationalism is by 
itself not a sufficient explanation of the outbreak of war. The type of nationalism is 
shaped to a large extent by the democratization process, although a degree of national 
identity must somehow be present in the population beforehand.  
In the analysis I will thus investigate how nationalist rhetoric was used in the 
mobilization of voters, and which elites appealed to national identity in their 
mobilizing efforts. Drawing on the theoretical debate regarding the origins of 
nationalism, I will also investigate to what extent nationalist rhetoric was built around  
an already existing identity, or one mainly constructed  in the wake of 
democratization. I will analyze whether a national identity was sufficiently in place, 
and how the existence or lack of a national identity impacted on the use of national 
rhetoric and  the likelihood of its success. If the analysis shows that the presence or 
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3. Historical Background 
In this chapter the context of the Russo-Chechen conflict will be presented. The 
format of this thesis does not permit deep digging into the historical causes of the 
conflict, nor is the historical background emphasized heavily in Snyder’s approach. 
The historical relationship between Russia and Chechnya will, however, not be 
dismissed as unimportant.  
3.1 The historical relationship between Russia and 
Chechnya 
The relationship between Russian and Chechnya dates back to the 18th century, when 
the Russian Empire sought to conquer the Caucasus and advance its territory towards 
the Black Sea. Chechnya was finally incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1858, 
after resistance of the local population. On the Chechen side, Imam Shamil was a 
heroic figure. His guerilla methods became the ideal of later resistance (Radnitz, 
2006: 245). The Russian General Alexei Yermolov, famous for his brutal warfare, 
was the one who finally made Shamil and his men surrender (Gall and De Waal, 
1997: 40).  From then on Chechnya was put under Russian administration. Some 
degree of autonomy came after the revolution in 1917. The Chechens and the 
Dagestanis got temporarily independence in 1918, when they set up a North 
Caucasus Republic, but by 1921 the republic had been incorporated into the Soviet 
Union (Lieven, 1998: 318).   
Stalin cracked heavily down on rebellion in Chechnya in 1929, and in 1936 it was 
merged with Ingushetia and given the status of an autonomous republic (Gall and De 
Waal, 1997: 55). The republic was dissolved in 1944, and most inhabitants were 
deported to Kazakhstan after alleged cooperation with the Germans during the 
Second World War. The deportation was not only based on groundless accusations 
by an increasingly paranoid Stalin, but also carried out in the most brutal way. Half a 
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million people were forced on board trains and transported to the steppe of 
Kazakhstan, many did not even survive the three week long journey. Others died of 
hunger due to poor living conditions in Kazakhstan (Gall and De Waal, 1997: 61). 
The deportees were allowed to return only in 1957, when Chechnya-Ingushetia was 
reinstated (Gall and De Waal, 1997: 72). 
Russia had always been the cultural and political center of an empire, both before and 
during the Soviet Union, while Chechnya was in the distant periphery, and had few 
cultural traits in common with Russia. The relationship between Chechnya and 
Russia has been cold, but assertions about the constant resistance of the Chechens are 
often overrated. During Soviet times calls for independence were not voiced, 
although negative sentiments against the Russians were widespread. Chechnya was 
among the poorest regions of Russia, with a low degree of literacy and industrial 
development, and thus highly dependant on economic transactions from the centre. 
Russians, on the other hand, were not particularly fond of the peoples of the 
Caucasus, who were often perceived to be wild and uncivilized. Some accounts of the 
war, especially made by Chechens, recon that the war was unavoidable, because of 
the history of violence between Russians and Chechens. Leaders of the Chechen 
independence forces have repeatedly stressed that the Chechens never formally 
submitted to Russia, never signed any document of surrender or accession, and 
therefore have full legal and moral rights to independence (Lieven, 1998: 304).   
One might allege that it was not a coincidence that the most radical attempts at 
sovereignty after the fall of the Soviet Union happened in Chechnya. The memory of 
deportation and how this injured the collective dignity is sometimes given as the chief 
reason for why the Chechens wanted to break out and form a sovereign state, in 
addition to the large size of the Chechen population relative to other ethnicities within 
Russia. This thesis argues, on the other hand,  that a history of violent confrontations 
and hate is not sufficient to explain the outbreak of the war at a later stage in history. 
The manner in which Russia first conquered Chechnya, and its inhabitant’s treatment 
and resistance during Stalin’s regime, are among the issues to keep in mind when 
attempting to understand the relationship between the Chechens and Russians in a 
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wider context. The Chechens’ motivation in resisting Russian rule following the fall 
of the Soviet Union might be based on historical enmity, but it is likely that the way 
the elite portrayed the historical roles of Chechnya and Russia is just as important as 
the history by itself. I agree here with Evangelista (2002: 12) who says that “shared 
history did not predetermine the outbreak of war in 1994, but it does go some way 
toward explaining the Chechens’ desire for greater autonomy as the Soviet Union 
disintegrated.” 
Considering that ethnicity served as a basis for administrative division in the Soviet 
Union, it is somehow surprising that violent conflict has not broken out more 
frequently in Russia. Several other regions challenged the authority of the center, and 
some achieved a significant degree of sovereignty through special agreements. In 
other regions of Russia, including autonomous republics such as Tatarstan, former 
communist leaders managed to reinvent themselves in the face of nationalist 
pressures and remain in control (Evangelista, 2002: 16). Violent conflict could 
perhaps have erupted in other parts of Russia as well, but were avoided by using 
conflict solving mechanisms. Thus, the potential for local solutions to demands of 
sovereignty was significant, and it seems even more surprising that other attempts at 
solving disagreements between the Chechen and the Russian governments were not 
exhausted, or even attempted, before the decision to go to war was made. 
3.2 The fall of the Soviet Union 
Both the construction and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (USSR) were 
initiated largely from Russia. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, took over power in 
Russia in 1917, and spent the years until 1922 building up a Union of 15 republics, 
where both the politics and the economy would be governed by the Communist Party 
(Sakwa, 2002: 5). By 1987, the foundation of the Union was shaking, due to 
international pressure, economic stagnation and serious failures of governance. 
Reforms intended to modernize and thereby secure the survival of the Soviet system 
were initiated. Instead the state fell apart. 
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Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, was the initiator 
of the political reforms starting in the late 1980s. Perestroika (reorganization) and 
Glasnost (opening) were basically aimed at democratizing the political system. The 
one-party state was supposed to remain, but power was to be moved from central 
party organs to the local level, and more autonomy given to local party branches 
(Sakwa, 2002: 10). In 1989 the first contested elections in the Soviet Union were 
held, the elections of representatives to the Congress of Deputies. The Communist 
party was still the only legitimate party (White, et al., 1997: 23). For the first time, 
though, alternative organizations outside the party were established. In Russia, a mix 
of civil society organizations and political lobby groups emerged. The new 
organizations mainly articulated demands for changes in the political and economic 
system at different levels, and Democratic Russia became a vehicle for the liberal 
Russian opposition. Nationalist groups such as Pamyat (Memory) and Otechestvo 
(Fatherland) were advocating a national revival in Russia, but were more marginal 
(McFaul, 1997: 23). In some other parts of the Union, the organizations focused more 
heavily on the national revival of the titular nation. This was also the case in 
Chechnya. Here a number of organizations emerged, focusing on the history and 
culture of the Chechen people. The Popular Front was established in 1988, and the 
core issues on the agenda were the deportation in 1944, and the Chechen struggle 
against incorporation into the Russian Empire.  
The opening of the political space also meant more freedom for the media and the 
introduction of new views and debates in the public discourse. New publications 
appeared at a rapid pace, and it became legitimate to question the foundation on 
which the Soviet Union was built, and to challenge it with alternative ideologies. By 
creating new arenas for participation and freedom of speech, Gorbachev thus made it 
possible for a wide variety of political actors, such as radical democrats, hard-line 
communist conservatives, and nationalists to seize the initiative (Remington, 2004: 
46). Once the strict control of the Communist Party had been loosened, the unity 
among the republics proved to be much weaker than he had anticipated. In the Baltic 
republics and Georgia, for example, noisy demands for national independence came 
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as a result of the new, open atmosphere. Eventually, this opening of the political 
space, in combination with other factors, led to the breakdown of the Soviet system.  
In august 1991 the Soviet Union made its final exhale. A failed coup attempt was led 
by  prominent members of the government, the so-called ‘gang of eight’ (Sakwa, 
2002: 29). 7 The failure of the coup makers to regain power undermined not only the 
conservatives within the communist party, but also the within-system reformers, led  
by Gorbachev himself (Sakwa, 2002: 437). The winners of the coup were the Russian 
reformists, led by Boris Yeltsin. Gorbachev resigned, and the Soviet Union 
disintegrated rapidly after this.  
Emerging political elites in Russia and Chechnya seized the new opportunities which 
came with the opening of the system. These new elites managed to undermine the 
Soviet institutions, mobilize the population for support, and gain power. In the period 
after this sudden take-over, problems arose both places due to insufficient 
institutionalization of the new regime. In the following two chapters I analyze 
developments in Chechnya and Russia in this period and show how the 
democratization process contributed to the outbreak of war.  
 
7 Some of the members of this group were Vice President Gennady Yanayev, KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov, Soviet 
Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, and Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov (Bransten, 2001) 
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4. The Russian side 
“The Russian state which chooses democracy and freedom will never be an empire. It will never be “a 
big brother” or a “younger brother”. It will be equal among equals. It is short-sighted from a political 
point of view, immoral from an ethical point of view, and foolish from a man’s point of view, to waste 
time and cling to old dogmas and ideals that were and are preached by some.” 
Boris Yeltsin (1992: 4), after the coup attempt in 1991 
In Russia, an institutional vacuum followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
weak institutions facilitated development of internal power struggle between 
competing elites. The unpredictable institutional structure of the state contributed to a 
political environment where confrontation instead of cooperation became the norm.  
4.1 Institutional development in Russia  
The democratization process in Russia was more complicated than in many other 
countries, since it came simultaneously with the building of a new state structure and 
economic system. The power holders had been elected during the last years of Soviet 
rule. The processes starting before the fall of the Soviet Union, and the disintegration 
process itself, had a great impact on the institutionalization of the Russian state. The 
institutional vacuum was filled gradually and on an ad hoc basis. This thesis deals 
mainly with the elites and their opportunities to mobilize support, and will thus focus 
on institutional aspects which can explain the actions of the elite, as well as the 
development of conflicts between them. In particular, the analysis will take into 
account the disintegration of decision making institutions, and the following lack of 
power division between the executive and the legislative branch. The opening of the 
media environment which took place parallel to this will also be discussed. This does 
not mean that other institutions were irrelevant. In Snyder’s theory, both the sequence 
of institutionalization and the strength of the institutions that are introduced are 
central when explaining how conflict comes about.  
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Establishment of new institutions 
During Soviet times power was institutionalized within the Communist Party, and its 
administrative center was located in the RSFSR (Sakwa, 2002: 16). Practically all 
power was in the hands of the Moscow-based elite, which consequently had a lot to 
loose from a decentralization of power. A typical trait of Soviet politics was that 
political authority traditionally was linked with persons instead of institutions, 
making the institutions functionally weak. In the political culture one had to 
circumvent the institutional channels, because personal authority and networks were 
far more important to influence policy making than the judicial basis of the 
institutions. Respect for the formal institutions was low among the elite, and this 
implied that the legitimacy of the new institutions was low to start out with. Informal 
structures and working patterns with roots in the old Soviet regime were functioning 
below the surface (Devold, 2000: 63). This helps explain not only why the 
institutional design Russia was so poorly taken care of by the politicians, but also 
why Yeltsin’s government later, as we will see,  could allow themselves to disregard 
the authority of the parliament. 
Free parliamentary elections in the Soviet Republics in 1990 marked the end of the 
party monopoly of the Communist Party and opened the door to new political 
factions. The Communist party was the only party with a well-established 
organization.  As a result 86 percent of the new deputies in the Russian parliament 
were from the Communist Party. The rest of the deputies in these elections were 
independent. Boris Yeltsin was made chair of the parliament, and immediately started 
working for the division of the Union into independent states 8 (White, et al., 1997: 
31). 12 June 1990, the Russian legislature made its first declaration of state 
sovereignty (Sakwa, 2002: 17). After this, Russian law was given superiority over 
legislation passed on  the union level of the state. The Russian parliament played a 
 
8 Yeltsin had been deprived of his status in the Party in 1988 for criticizing the slowness of reforms. Running as an 
independent candidate in 1990, he received 80 percent of the votes from his home constituency Sverdlovsk, and the 
establishment of the Party could do little to prevent his return (Rose and Munro, 2002: 24). 
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vital role in the break-up of the Soviet Union and remained one of the power bases in 
the new Russian state. The other power base was the president, an office which was 
established on Yeltsin’s initiative. In a popular referendum in March 1991 more than 
fifty million Russians voted in favor of his suggestion 9(White, et al., 1997: 76). In 
June Yeltsin was elected to the new post (Rose and Munro, 2002: 25).  
The introduction of a presidency was constitutionally problematic, because according 
to the Russian constitution, the parliament was given ultimate authority. With the 
establishment of a president, the division of power between these two became 
unclear. The new Russian government operated under the constitution that was 
adopted in 1978. This constitution had, after more than three hundred amendments, 
become a self-contradictory document where both the legislative and executive 
branch had supreme state power  (Rose and Munro, 2002: 26). The president was 
given extraordinary powers to issue decrees, but these were temporary and subject to 
approval by the parliament (Sakwa, 2002: 47). As the parliament had been elected in 
1990, with a big Communist majority, there was considerable resistance against some 
of Yeltsin’s policies. Yeltsin did not choose to dissolve parliament. Instead, he ruled 
extensively through presidential decrees to introduce new legislation and rules. Thus, 
even though the conservative fraction kept their parliamentarian majority, they had 
little opportunities to overrule Yeltsin’s decisions. According to Snyder’s theory 
competing elites represent a problem in the early stages of democratization, if the 
roles of different institutions are not clearly separated and there are no mechanisms to 
deal with diverging opinions. Later on in the process the relationship between the 
president and the parliament became a catalyst for the elite struggle.  
On 6 November 1991 Yeltsin issued a presidential decree which banned the 
Communist party in Russia (Sakwa, 2002: 102). This also led to disappearance of the 
most central decision-making institutions in Russia, such as the Politburo and the 
 
9 75.1 % of the total electorate participated in the referendum, and 69.9 % of the votes were cast in favour of the question: 
“Do you consider it necessary to introduce the post of RSFSR president, who would be elected by a republicwide popular 
vote?” (White, et al., 1997: 76) 
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Central Committee (Lieven, 1998: 95). All the major institutions of the Soviet state 
were discredited, with the partial exception of the military. The rule of law was weak 
and the courts lacked authority and independence. The absence of a clear demarcation 
between Soviet and Russian institutions gave rise to a dangerous vacuum of 
authority, and  Russia in effect suffered from a form of dual power (Sakwa, 2002: 31-
33). The challenge was to replace the old Soviet institutions with new ones. On 8 
December 1991, the leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine proclaimed the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union (Rose and Munro, 2002: 25). Russia became a 
sovereign state with two supreme powers – the parliament and the president.  
Conflict between the president and the parliament 
The reform government of Yeltsin continued to rule extensively through decrees in 
the first years of independence. In the economic sphere major reforms were 
undertaken from 1992. The command economy was to be replaced by a capitalistic 
one. The main architect behind the reforms was Yegor Gaidar, who later became the 
acting prime minister (Sakwa, 2002: 37). He wanted to pursue the type of ‘shock 
therapy’ other post-communist states, such as Poland, had gone through, but this had 
a major impact on the welfare of the population. Not only did prices sky rocket and 
salaries diminish, but the privatization processes favored the elite, and gave a small 
number of people the opportunity to gain a large share of former state assets. This 
also contributed to de-legitimize Yeltsin’s government. Those who managed to take 
over big business in Russia were mostly former members of the Communist party 
youth organization Komsomol (Remington, 2004: 161). They had climbed the 
hierarchy of the party structure and used their network and influence for personal 
gains - later they became known as the oligarchs. Political contacts helped them win 
crucial licenses and monopolies early in the post-communist period, and while the 
oligarchs could use financial means to influence politics, government officials could 
enrich themselves (Remington, 2004: 114). The oligarchs’ strong position weakened 
the political institutions even further. This in turn contributed to the population’s 
distrust both in the market system and in the new political regime. This way the 
economic dimension of the state-building process had impacts far beyond the 
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economic sphere. The struggle between the president and the parliament increased as 
the president pushed for an economic  policy not approved by the legislature. The 
parliament tried to counter presidential decrees after the adoption of economic 
reforms in 1992, and  unsuccessfully attempted to remove Yeltsin from office and 
impeach him. Several times parliament attempted to undermine Yeltsin’s politics, for 
example by refusing to accept his proposals for the post of prime minister. Yeltsin, 
for his part, increasingly resorted to emergency measures because of what he saw as 
parliamentary obstruction of his reforms (White, et al., 1997: 78-81). At least for a 
while, he managed to keep the parliament at a distance. The immediate institutional 
problem was the absence of a constitution designed for the new state. The central 
government had not established itself before the onset of reforms. Snyder’s theory 
emphasizes the sequencing of steps in the democratization process, where the 
establishment of a central government ideally comes before parties are introduced 
and elections are held. In relation to Russia, we see how the lack of constitutional 
clarity generated problems. The two branches of power distrusted one another, and 
discredited the other branch. Such a state of events hardly contribute to public 
confidence in the effectiveness of democratic institutions. 
The internal conflict intensifies 
In 1993 the latent conflict between the president and the parliament reached the 
surface, in what turned out to be a chaotic year for the Russian government. Both 
Yeltsin and the parliament used extreme measures to discredit the power of the other 
branch. Yeltsin was about to exhaust his possibilities to rule through decrees, and on 
20 March, he announced the introduction by decree of a "special regime" of 
presidential rule, where the parliament would be unable to overrule whatever he and 
his government chose to adopt (White, et al., 1997: 79). The constitutional court 
overruled this decision as unconstitutional (RFE/RL, 20.03.1993). Yeltsin decided 
that a referendum on public confidence in the president and his socio-economic 
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policies was to be held in April.10 With a 64 percent turnout in the referendum the 
support for the president was not overwhelming (NUPI, 25.04.1993). The result was 
still interpreted as support for the government to go ahead with the new constitution. 
In his theory Snyder emphasizes the unwillingness of elites to give away control to 
other branches of power in a democratizing process. The referendum can be seen as a 
way for Yeltsin to circumvent the decision made by the constitutional court, and this 
action contributed to discrediting both the constitution and the constitutional court. 
This illustrates how weak institutions are dangerous, and how the elite can take 
advantage of institutional weakness to pursue their own interests. This in turn 
weakens the institutions even further. 
The frictions between the president and the parliament continued during the process 
of mapping out a new constitution, and Yeltsin finally dissolved the parliament on 21 
September 1993, calling for new elections in December. Again, the constitutional 
court ruled that there were grounds for impeachment, due to violation of 
constitutional clauses (Rose and Munro, 2002: 29). Yeltsin and his supporters argued 
that the constitution was a document of the Soviet period and that there was no other 
way of resolving the deadlock (White, et al., 1997: 92). Yet again, Yeltsin’s actions 
served to undermine the legitimacy the constitutional court. This provoked a coup 
attempt by central figures in the parliament, such as Ruslan Khasbulatov and 
Alexander Rutskoi, who condemned Yeltsin’s action as a “state coup” and voted for 
his dismissal (White, et al., 1997: 93). Demonstrations were arranged in support of 
the parliamentarians, who had barricaded themselves inside the White House, the 
building where the parliament was situated. They tried to start a national revolt 
against Yeltsin, but he used the military to take the power back, and the leaders of the 
rebellion were arrested (Remington, 2004: 55). According to the official report, 145 
people were killed and more than 800 were wounded (White, et al., 1997: 94). 
 
10 The referendum consisted of four questions: (1) Do you have confidence in the President of the Russian Federation, 
Boris Yeltsin?; (2) Do you approve of the socio-economic policies carried out by the president and government of the 
Russian Federation since 1992?; (3) Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections for the presidency of the Russian 
Federation?; (4) Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections for the people's deputies of the Russian Federation? 
(NUPI, 25.04.1993) 
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Yeltsin could continue his work for a referendum on the constitution and the election 
of a new parliament. It became apparent that mechanisms facilitating peaceful 
conflict resolution were missing. The deadlock between the president and the 
parliament resulted in a violent confrontation which further weakened the democratic 
institutions as well as the trust in these. Yeltsin’s actions clearly show that he 
disregarded democratic institutions such as the parliament, the constitution and the 
constitutional court so as to avoid being overruled by the legislative branch. This is 
consistent with Snyder’s theory, which claims  that the elite will seek to manipulate 
weak institutions for its own gains.  
In the December 1993 parliamentary elections Yeltsin sought to be “above” the 
conflict between parties, by not explicitly endorsing any one party (White, et al., 
1997: 68). Consequently, none of the parties felt obliged to follow his course of 
action. The parties or electoral blocs that contested in the election were all very new. 
Half of them were founded earlier the same year; many were ad hoc alliances formed 
for the purpose of contesting in the elections, and only three dated from 1990, when 
political parties had been formally legalized (White, et al., 1997: 110). The 
democratically minded parties did not manage to unite in a single bloc, one main 
reason being disagreements over the constitution (Sakwa, 1995: 201). 11 The winners 
were the parties in opposition to Yeltsin’s government, who won 39,5 % of the seats.  
The main parties in the opposition were the renewed Communist Party (CPRF) and 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR). Both based their policy on a rejection of 
Yeltsin’s government, and despite many differences in their programs, they managed 
to portray themselves as an alternative to the sitting government. 
The constitution was subject to a referendum on the same day as the elections, after a 
long and hard struggle over its content. The opposition used the low turnout, which 
barely satisfied the legal requirement that half the electorate take part, to challenge 
 
11 Four parties competed for the position on the democratic side. These were Russia’s choice (leader: Gaidar), Yabloko 
(leader: Yavlinsky), Party of Russian Unity and Accord (leader: Shakhrai) and Russian movement for Democratic Reforms 
(leaders: Popov, Sobchak, Yakovlev). Russia’s Choice was the most successful of these, and also the party most supportive 
of Yeltsin’s policies (Sakwa, 1995). 
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the validity of the constitution 12 (Rose and Munro, 2002: 30). In addition, the 
president had called for a referendum, and this was against the procedures stated in 
the 1978 constitution. Some also questioned the authenticity of the voting figures 
(White, et al., 1997: 99). The constitution was adopted, but the chaotic and unruly 
process preceding the referendum contributed to a further weakening of trust in both 
the constitution itself, and in the branches it granted power to. In a survey, only 14 
percent thought the new constitution would help establish a lawful and democratic 
Russian state, while 30 percent thought the opposite, and around half found it 
“difficult to say” 13 (White, et al., 1997: 101). 
The division of power became clearer with the adoption of the new constitution. 
According to this document, power between the executive and the legislative 
branches is clearly separated, but the distribution of power is unequal. The 
constitution gave the president and the prime minister appointed by him a very 
central role, and the president had the authority to issue decrees without Duma 
approval (Rose and Munro, 2002: 110). In reality, this meant that there was a 
fundamental lack of checks and balances on the decision making process. The 
population did thus not have the opportunity to exercise pressure on the president 
through their elected representatives in parliament, because this branch could not 
effectively work as a counterbalance to the president. When the president later chose 
to go to war in Chechnya, this decision was not subject to approval by the parliament, 
because the decision was made in a presidential decree (NUPI, 11. December 1994 ). 
The impact of the media 
Finally, this chapter will describe how the marketplace of ideas influenced the 
political process in Russia. With glasnost, the space for freedom of speech increased 
 
12 54.8 % of the electorate took part in the referendum. 58.4 % of the votes were cast in favour of the question: “Do you 
approve of the constitution of the Russian Federation?” (White, et al., 1997: 99) 
13 The survey “New Russia Barometer III” was performed by Centre for the Study of Public Policy. It was conducted in 
early spring 1994, and interviewed large nationwide representative samples of the Russian population, 3,535 persons were 
interviewed (White, et al., 1997: 43) 
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substantially. Almost overnight the strict censorship disappeared, resulting in an 
overwhelming flow of all sorts of previously suppressed points of view, be they 
political, cultural or other. Freed from censorship, the new quality papers acted as a 
forum for debate of public issues (Sakwa, 2002: 332). A new diversity in the media 
developed after independence, and the number of central newspapers nearly doubled 
between 1991 and 1993. In the Soviet Union freedom of the press had not been 
protected legally, but in August 1990 a new media law was introduced, and in 
December 1991 Yeltsin signed a new Russian law on the media (Benn, 1996: 2). This 
opening of the marketplace of ideas was on the one hand a sign of democratization, 
because it allowed for a diversity of new opinions and ideologies to be expressed in 
the public space. On the other hand it allowed for intensified political competition 
and contributed to harden the fronts. Snyder’s theory claims that an opened 
marketplace of ideas can contribute to the escalation of nationalist mobilization, but 
this was not the case in the earliest stages of Russian democratization. Despite full 
media freedom, nationalist demands were seldom articulated. This is probably related 
to the lack of a historical national identity, which will be discussed later on. The 
media did however play a significant role when the opposition decided to play the 
nationalist card in relation to the 1993 elections. The media had an enormous impact 
on public opinion, especially since the removal of censorship gave the public a reason 
to trust what was actually written.  
In the early democratization phase independent media were supportive of Yeltsin’s 
government and its challenge against the communist regime. The economic reforms 
were not well received, and soon the media started criticizing the new regime instead. 
The media criticism contributed heavily to Yeltsin’s steep fall in popularity. 
Reinstating some control over the media became an important issue for Yeltsin. 
Before the 1993 parliamentary elections, the government was clearly pushing for 
media’s support, and some papers were abolished if supporting others (Benn, 1996: 
3). The battle for voters during election time was largely won through appeals to the 
public via media channels, in particular television, to which 95% of Russian 
households had access in 1993. The struggle for control over television was thus 
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central in the battle between the president and the parliament in 1993 (Benn, 1996: 
475). The role of the media in influencing public opinion, particularly as regards 
support for candidates, seemed to contribute to the aggressive political environment 
at this stage. For example, Yeltsin’s government used its control over national 
television to play down the influence of the nationalists, but this backfired when 
Zhirinovsky bought 220 minutes of airtime on the eve of elections (Kipp, 1994: 75). 
The success of Zhirinovsky’s intensive pre-election campaign will be further 
discussed in the chapter on nationalist mobilization.  
4.2 Elite competition in Russia 
Snyder’s theory indicates that competition between elites is dangerous in a 
democratization process, if the rules of the game are not defined. As demonstrated, 
the institutions that were built in Russia were weak and their interaction was 
characterized by frequent clashes of interests. The events leading up to the coup 
attempt and the parliamentary election in 1993 contributed to an extremely tense 
situation. The coup ended in a bloody battle between the different fractions. The 
decline of control over the federal subjects was also characteristic of this period, and 
political opponents of Yeltsin questioned his ability to protect the territorial integrity 
of the country. Elite competition between different political fractions in the wake of 
democratization created high pressure on the president to maintain order in Russia. 
This contributed heavily to a situation in which he was willing to apply violent 
means, and start a “short victorious war” to regain the popularity he had lost in the 
course of the last two years. 
Division and continuity of the elites 
Glasnost created new opportunities for elites to emerge and take power, and this 
allowed a reformist elite to organize and eventually take over power. The majority of 
the political elite had, however, received their training in the Communist Party, and 
had climbed the party ladder in order to gain influence in society. The Russian elite is 
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characterized by continuity, meaning that major parts had served in leading 
government positions under the previous Soviet regime (Kryshtanovskaya and White, 
1996: 728). While continuity was characteristic at a personal level, new divisions 
emerged at the ideological level. A main divide emerged between the conservative 
elite, who wanted to keep the Union, and the reformist elite, who wanted to turn the 
political system into a democracy, and to divide the Union into sovereign states. Not 
surprisingly, the reformist elite, which opposed the old system and demanded 
political change and economic improvements, won a lot of support in the early stages 
of Russian independence. This meant that they did not need to make compromises 
with the old rulers to get access to powerful positions. The new Russian government 
did not attempt to make a pact with the former elite, both because of their massive 
popular support, and because the legal and institutional landscape they operated in 
was blurry (Lane, 1996: 545). McFaul (1997: 12) maintains that extremists on both 
sides prevented the communists and liberals from making a pact. In the long run, the 
absence of a pact at this stage made compromise difficult later on in the process. 
The popularity of the reformist elite was solid and supported by large parts of the 
population, but it lasted only a short period. By 1993, parallel with the crisis of the 
government, Yeltsin’s popularity fell steeply. The transformation of the economic 
system, which initially accounted for a significant part of the support for Yeltsin’s 
government, had become deeply unpopular with ordinary Russians. At the end of 
February 1993, a poll was conducted to compare Yeltsin’s popularity with that of 
Ruslan Khasbulatov, his successor as chair of the parliament. Of 1032 persons polled,  
35 % favored the president, 12 % favored Khasbulatov, while 53 % favored none 
(FBIS-SOV-93-057, 26. March 1993). This signaled a demand for change, and 
through the chaotic period of 1993 the support for Yeltsin fell like a rock to the 
ground. Khasbulatov had previously supported Yeltsin and acted as a buffer against 
the opposing forces in parliament, but in the tense situation he had now turned against 
Yeltsin, making his position a lot weaker (NG, 12. March 1993). By fall 1994, polls 
showed that 70 percent of Russians were dissatisfied with Yeltsin’s performance 
(Snyder, 2000: 236). 
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The opposition unites against the government 
According to Snyder’s theory, a threatened elite is willing to go to great lengths to 
secure its power base. In the course of only a few years, the new power elite in Russia 
had become a threatened elite. The events of 1993 demonstrate that this was the case. 
If Yeltsin had not felt threatened by the power of the parliament, he would probably 
not have dissolved it. In addition, Yeltsin, who had based his political takeover on 
liberalism, was now faced with the demands of the opposition to step down. Snyder 
claims that the elite in a democratizing state seldom will choose liberalism as its 
ideology, because it would entail true accountability to the electorate. Yeltsin’s 
ideological choice looked good on the surface, but he did not manage to fully pursue 
this ideal. Thus he became trapped in his own policy. According to Snyder’s theory a 
threatened elite will resort to extreme and desperate actions. Yeltsin’s reactions 
towards parliament clearly illustrate his desperation. Yet, Yeltsin did not choose to 
turn to nationalist rhetoric in this situation. His political opponents were more active 
in raising a nationalist discourse, which we will see in the next chapter. 
The oppositional elite consisted mainly of communists and nationalists. Growing 
discontent with the performance of the government gave rise to a rejectionist front. A 
common hostility against the new order,  the break-up of the Soviet Union, the 
radical economic reforms and Yeltsin’s style of leadership, was enough to unite them 
in opposition to the government (Sakwa, 2002: 47). The Communist Party (CPRF) 
had been re-registered in February 1993 with Gennady Zyuganov as leader, and had 
kept many supporters from Soviet times, especially in the old generation. Major parts 
of the ideology remained the same as well, but in addition the CPRF emphasized 
nationalist issues. Zyuganov was also forging a national front, aiming to unite left and 
right opposition (NG, 16 February 1993). CPRF, supported by the agrarian party, saw 
the 1993 parliamentary elections as illegal, but participated in order to “prevent the 
dictatorship from being legalized” (White, et al., 1997: 113). In a way, the CPRF was 
an old elite which managed to renew itself in the political process of 1993, and 
resurface as a new elite in opposition to the sitting government. The far right Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDPR), the first registered party in the Soviet Union, had an 
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organizational structure which allowed it to do well in the elections. Its leader 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky had demagogic skills which outmaneuvered most other 
politicians, and the party program was based on a rejection of the system as such, not 
only on the rejection of the political path taken by the democrats. The success of 
Zhirinovsky in the elections came as a surprise to the great majority of political 
commentators. Polls at the start of the campaign had given him a low turnout, this 
indicated that the campaigning had been extremely effective (Remington, 2004: 121). 
Within Snyder’s theoretical framework, the LDPR fits the description of an 
upcoming elite which seizes the new opportunities for mobilization on a nationalist 
doctrine. CPRF and LDPR differed ideologically, but agreed on the rejection of 
Yeltsin’s policies, and on the emphasis on Russia as a superior state in need to show 
strength. Their dominance in the parliament after the election pushed Yeltsin’s 
policies in a new direction, as we will see below.  
Yeltsin’s government did not resort to nationalist rhetoric before the parliamentary 
elections. This issue was free for the opposition to take advantage of, as Yeltsin’s 
government did not emphasize a distinct Russian identity. It was the opposition 
which managed to mobilize voters around nationalist claims. What is striking in the 
Russian case, is how the elections and the new nationalist discourse still pushed the 
government to move in a more patriotic direction. 
Regional demands weaken governmental control 
The government’s lack of territorial control was another issue that triggered 
opposition. This issue was also an important factor behind  the decision to go to war 
in Chechnya. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there were voiced demands 
for more autonomy in several parts of the state. In 1990, Russia was still essentially a 
unitary state, run from Moscow with few inter-regional coalitions of any real 
significance. By 1994 it had developed into a highly asymmetrical federation, with 
Moscow engaged in extensive selective bargaining with subjects of the federation 
(Solnick, 1998: 67). This was largely due to pressure by local elites for more 
autonomy in the anarchic atmosphere which emerged. Without the Soviet institutions 
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for control of the regions, the government was left in a weak position. It seems that 
the federal policy towards the republics was ad hoc, and dependant on personalities 
of the leaders on the national and sub-national levels (Solnick, 1998). Tatarstan was 
one of the most persistent regions when it came to demands for autonomy. The leader 
Mintimer Shaimiyev pursued a tactic of offensive negotiations, which eventually led 
to a high degree of autonomy. In February 1994 Yeltsin signed a bilateral treaty with 
Tatarstan, and later with more subjects (Solnick, 1998: 66). Obviously, it was 
effective to negotiate with the center, because the government was weakly established 
at the time and willing to give in demands to avoid further territorial disintegration. 
With the signing of the agreement with Tatarstan, Chechnya remained the most acute 
territorial issue on the agenda for Russia, and parts of the government pushed forward 
for a military solution to this problem. 
Changes in government after the elections 
After the parliamentary elections, Yeltsin’s position was increasingly threatened and 
he was ready to make drastic changes in order to defend his power base. Lapidus 
(1998: 17) claims that he was pushed to abandon his liberal image, supporters, and 
advisors in favor of a more nationalist and authoritarian strategy and greater reliance 
on hard-line political advisors. Yet his popularity continued to fall in 1994 and in 
September, 70 per cent of those polled disapproved of Yeltsin's performance. McFaul 
(1995) therefore claims:  
“If Yeltsin was going to win reelection in June 1996, he had to act and talk more like 
Zhirinovsky and less like the "democrats." In other words, he had to adapt to the new 
reality, in which one fourth of the electorate supported a political party which was 
against his reforms and policies.”  
Democratic-minded, market-oriented people were replaced by more nationalistic 
people, which made the government more “hawkish”. Several of these officials had 
been in Yeltsin’s government from the beginning, but after the elections the influence 
of this coalition grew (McFaul, 1997: 28). The winning party of the elections, LDPR, 
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was not represented in the new government at all, and the government did not reflect 
the political parties in parliament. Still, the policies of the government were becoming 
more influenced by the issues put on the agenda during the elections. Consequently, 
Yeltsin’s policies moved further away from the reformist direction he had taken 
earlier, and the gap between his advisors and the democratic parties widened (McFaul 
1995). The most active proponents of a military solution of the Chechen problem 
were increasing their influence.14 This group is often referred to as the ”Party of 
War”, a name they were given by the liberal press in Russia, as it is assumed that they 
were the ones who advised Yeltsin to launch a military attack on Grozny (McFaul 
1995). The liberal fractions of the government argued against using military means, 
but had lost a lot of influence.15 Yegor Gaidar resigned in January 1994, due to the 
lack of support for his economic policy in the new parliament (NG, 18 January 1994 
). Boris Fyodorov also resigned from the government after the elections, thereby 
effectively showing that the democrats were about to lose their position in 
government (McFaul, 1995). The major changes in the configuration of Yeltsin’s 
government in 1994 prompted a shift in policy toward Chechnya (Lapidus, 1998: 17). 
In November 1994 the Russian Security Council held a secret meeting in which they 
ratified the decision already taken by President Yeltsin to utilize Russian military 
forces to subdue Chechnya (Lapidus, 1998: 19). 
Here we clearly see how the divide between competing elites, which established itself 
at the very beginning of the democratization process, became an obstacle for the 
Yeltsin government later in the process. It was perhaps the lack of compromise early 
in the process which made the conservative fraction so determinant to undermine his 
policies. Still, this does not fully explain the emergence of the extreme nationalists in 
the 1993 elections, as this elite was fairly new in the political landscape. To 
 
14 These were Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Federal Counterintelligence Service (former KGB) head Sergei Stepashin, 
First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Yegorov, Security Council secretary Oleg 
Lobov, and Alexander Korzhakov, head of Yeltsin's personal security(McFaul, 1995) 
15 These were for example prime minister Victor Chernomyrdin, first deputy prime minister Anatoly Chubais, Yeltsin’s 
chief of staff Sergei Filatov and the presidential advisors Baturin, Kostikov and Satarov (McFaul, 1995) 
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understand how Zhirinovsky and the LDPR could receive the highest share of the 
votes in the elections, we also need to take into account the rhetoric of nationalism, 
which they successfully managed to introduce into the political discourse. In turn, 
Yeltsin also became more nationalist-minded, but without engaging in the nationalist 
public discourse. The decision to intervene in Chechnya was instead his contribution 
to win back the nationalists in the population. 
4.3 Nationalist mobilization in Russia 
As we have seen, nationalist mobilization was not a central issue in the very 
beginning of the democratization process in Russia, rather liberalism and regime 
change were important. This is probably related to the historical lack of a national 
identity in Russia. Before the 1993 elections, oppositional elites managed to make 
nationalism an issue. Both the CPRF and the LDPR were active in this patriotic 
discourse. This made Yeltsin turn to a tougher patriotic policy, and more inclined to 
use force. Snyder does not emphasize the level of development of the national 
identity in his theory. Since the two parties of the war differ significantly in this 
respect, a discussion of this aspect will still be included here. I will below substantiate 
the claim that Russia historically lacks a national identity, and describe how 
nationalism yet became a political issue before the war in Chechnya.  
Lack of a historical national identity 
Russia did not experience the kind of national revolution which occurred in several 
European states in the 18th and 19th centuries, something historians mainly attribute to 
the lack of a bourgeoisie, low social mobility, a lack of liberalization and late 
industrialization and modernization (See for example Kolstø, 1999: 47; Tolz, 2001: 
34). Russia has been the center of an empire, and has not been a nation state of its 
own. In line with Gellner’s theory, the lack of industrialization was particularly 
important in this regard – the need for a common identity simply did not emerge, as 
the rulers did not have the acute need to attach the population to the state. Peter the 
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great introduced a number of reforms aimed at modernizing Russia in the 18th 
century, and this provoked protest reactions from the intellectuals against what was 
seen as “Europeanization” of the country, threatening cultural traits such as the 
Orthodox Church. If there were attempts at nation building, these were made by the 
intellectuals, and not by those in power. An important divide existed between the so-
called Slavophils and the Westernizers, and the debate evolved mainly around how 
Russia differs from Western culture. Later, this debate has been re-evoked in attempts 
to separate the Russian identity from Europe (Tolz, 2001).  
At the beginning of the 20th century European nation states were actively promoting 
their national identities. In Russia, however, attempts at building a separate Russian 
identity were practically non-existing. The territorial division of the Soviet Union 
was based on ethnic criteria, and the titular nations were given certain advantages 
within their territory. While local culture and language in this way was nurtured in 
other republics, no attempts were made to separate the Russian identity from the 
Soviet identity. Instead, Russia was the core area of the Union, and the main source 
of the Union-identity (Brubaker, 1994). As a result, Russian national identity remains 
an object of discussion, and a distinct national identity to replace the Soviet identity 
has not yet emerged. A nation is in a strictly theoretical sense built around a set of 
exclusionary traits which separate the members clearly from other peoples. This is 
simply not sufficiently established in Russia. This can explain why national demands 
did not dominate the discourses and independence movements in Russia, like they did 
in other parts of the Union. 
When the reformists took over power in Russia, they tried to build a civic identity 
which could replace the traditional loyalty to Soviet symbols. This was part of the 
strategy to win popular support, since the majority of the population was tired of 
Soviet references. Government positions were used to open public debate and 
increase political participation, but not to nurture a national identity. The reformist 
government of Yeltsin wanted to build a civic identity, which was a new thing in 
Russia. The concept “Rossiiskiy”  (Российский) was brought forward, intending to 
be an identity all citizens of Russia could share, determined mainly by their 
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relationship to the state and almost stripped of cultural references. The political 
opponents, on the other hand, were more active in making use of nationalist slogans 
in their argumentation. This was especially the case before the 1993 elections, when 
Yeltsin’s popularity was in sharp decline. The opposition emphasized patriotism and 
the rights of the Russian nation, rights which Yeltsin according to his opponents did 
not protect. One could argue that while the opposition claimed to protect the Russian 
national identity, this was not a national identity in a strict sense, but rather an 
imperial identity. Their argumentation was still informed by the idea of separating 
people into ‘us’ and ‘them’ categories, thereby constructing outside threats.  
The opposition uses nationalist rhetoric 
According to Vera Tolz (2001) three main visions of the Russian identity were 
nurtured by the opposition: a Union identity, based on the borders of the Soviet 
Union, a Slavic identity, based on a cultural and linguistic unity with other Slavic 
people, and a linguistic identity, which more strictly limits the identity on basis of the 
Russian language. The CPRF drew lines back to the Soviet Union in their patriotism. 
Zyuganov argued that the Russian empire and the Soviet Union constituted a unique 
Russian civilization, and combined this with the simultaneous belief that the Russian 
identity is actually a Slavic one. The party, in its use of symbols and its appeal to 
common values to unite the people, mixed those of the Soviet period (such as the red 
flag) with those of the Russian empire, which have an appeal only to ethnic Russians 
(Tolz, 2001: 257).  This way, they sought to reproduce the Soviet identity in a 
Russian form. An ethnocentric understanding of the word Russian – “Russkij” 
(Русский), was emphasized by this party, along with other Russian nationalists. In 
his election program Zyuganov emphasized nationalism and sought to distance his 
party from communist ideals and to present it as a reformed social democratic party. 
The nationalist political rhetoric of ‘us’ and ‘them’, the patriots and defenders of a 
sovereign Russian Empire on the one hand, and ‘bandits’ and enemies of the state on 
the other, was also taken in. The communists became the spokesmen of a broad 
opposition front which dubbed itself the “Russian resistance” (Русское 
сопротивление) (Flikke, 1999: 278).  
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The position of ultra-nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky was similar to that of 
Zyuganov, in other words a mixture of the three main above-mentioned identities 
(Tolz, 2001: 257). Zhirinovsky emphasized the superiority of the Russian nation, and 
actively created hate images of other groups. He promoted an extreme nationalist 
position, where both anti-Semitism and an aggressive foreign policy were 
ingredients. Before the 1993 elections he managed to appeal to the fear of the 
disintegration of Russia, and the damaged self-esteem of Russians after the fall of the 
empire. He was presented as a man of the people, who understood their suffering and 
longing (Kipp, 1994: 86). Zhirinovsky posited that the Russian empire was not a 
luxury but a means of national survival “Russians everywhere become a national 
minority, gradually being destroyed. This will be the slow murder of the Russian 
nation. Because nowhere is there purely Russian territory, nowhere…If we follow 
such a path, then the Russian nation will die.” He warned that denying Russia its 
historical borders would lead to war. Thus the mere acceptance of the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union was an act of treason (Kipp, 1994: 77). In addition to the 
disapproval of the breakup of the Union, Zhirinovsky criticized the democratization 
process and claimed that it had created an inefficient and unmanageable system. 
Russian sovereignty and authority had to remain unchallenged, and he actively 
referred to outside (or inside) enemies, attempting to undermine the rights of Russia: 
“For us the main [point] is the territory of our state. Return to us the historical borders 
and name of the state – we only want that!” (ibid). Zhirinovsky announced that a 
democratic system was not what Russia needed, a strong president with a wide 
mandate would be more efficient to remake Russia a superpower on the world stage. 
He rejected the federalist system with too much separation of powers: “What is 
needed is a strict, centralized authority, otherwise no reforms will be achieved. There 
must be one state, one president. But without a centralized economy.”(ibid) . 
Supporters of the LDPR policy opposed the idea of a territorial state in which 
citizenship is a function of residence, and thus rejected a civic state in favor of an 
ethnic state. LDPR ideologues understood the force of such ideas in the struggle for 
power (Kipp, 1994: 78). 
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To understand why the oppositional forces in Russian politics were so successful in 
mobilizing around nationalism before the 1993 election, one needs to take into 
consideration that the sitting government had not appealed to national identity. As 
mentioned, they instead emphasized a civic identity. Hence, the table was open for 
others to use the nationalist card, and the opposition took the opportunity at a time 
when Yeltsin’s popularity was falling. Opposition leaders devoted much more space 
in their writings and public speeches to the question of what the Russian nation is 
than president Yeltsin and his supporters in the executive branch of the government 
had done. The CPRF even set up analytical centers to produce ‘general theories’ 
about Russia’s post-communist nation-building. The opposition also exercised a 
strong influence upon the positions on nation-building taken by members of 
executive branch (Tolz, 2001: 259). Political competition was what brought the 
debate about national identity into the public sphere. A nationwide, public debate 
about the contents of the Russian nation did not emerge, the discourse was fairly 
limited within political and academic circles. Recall Nordlinger’s theory, which 
argues that democratization is more successful if the population can adhere to a 
common national identity before the onset of institutionalization. In Russia’s case 
competitive elections were introduced before the establishment of a common identity, 
and this meant that the identity was “up for grabs”. 
Yeltsin did not himself engage in the national discourse, but it seemed like he was 
moving his policies in a more patriotic direction. Tolz (2001: 259) argues that the 
shifts in Yeltsin’s perception of the Russian nation usually came as a reaction to 
pressure from the opposition. The war can be interpreted as his contribution to the 
discourse on national claims. By applying heavy force against a seceding republic 
threatening the territorial integrity of Russia, he was perhaps aiming to win back the 
votes of those supporting the nationalist opposition in the previous elections. Michael 
McFaul (1995) puts it like this: “Yeltsin did not order his troops into Chechnya to 
save the Russian Federation. He moved against Chechnya to save his presidency.” 
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4.4 Discussion of findings 
The political developments in Russia after the breakdown of the Soviet Union lead to 
a situation in which the government was willing to use military force to solve a 
territorial conflict. This analysis shows that the democratization process was an 
element contributing to this outcome. 
The political liberalization started already during the Soviet Union, before democratic 
institutions were introduced. In the typology of Nordlinger (1968), we can say that 
Russia did not follow a fruitful sequence of political change. The development of a 
national identity did not precede the establishment of a central government, which in 
turn did not precede the introduction of mass suffrage. The process of change 
happened very quickly, beginning with increased press freedom and freedom of 
association, before the introduction of mass suffrage and formation of political 
parties. Only after this came the institutionalization of the central government with 
the adoption of a constitution in 1993. The development of institutions was, 
meanwhile, to a large extent dependant on the personal influence of different power 
holders, rather than on the institutions they represented. The power struggle between 
the executive and the legislative in particular contributed to an environment which 
led to confrontations instead of cooperation. The lack of a pact between competing 
elites early in the process might explain why this struggle became so intense in 1993.  
Mechanisms to deal with diverging opinions were not sufficiently in place, and the 
president could solve any disagreement with the parliament by issuing decrees. This 
created a situation where the president had a high decree of autonomy in decision 
making processes. The lack of clear power divisions and a weak legal framework 
made elite friction emerge. The actions of the elites in connection with the elections 
and the coup attempt in 1993, in addition to the chaotic process leading to the 
adoption of the constitution, undermined the ability of the institutions to serve as 
channels for expression of the popular will. This led to a weakening of several of the 
institutions. The decision to go to war could thus be made by the president single-
handedly, without consulting the popularly elected parliament. This lack of effective 
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checks and balances on the executive branch of power was decisive, and it resulted 
from the insufficient democratization process.  
Elections held in an atmosphere of desperate power seeking contributed to the 
nationalistic turn in Russian politics. It must, however, be underlined that no massive 
nationalist mobilization took place. The lack of nation building by the post-Soviet 
government was used extensively by the opposition to get votes and to discredit 
Yeltsin’s rule. With an almost anarchic marketplace of ideas, competition for 
attention and support escalated. This provoked extreme opinions to reach the surface. 
The lack of prior nation building in Russia meant that the elite could choose from a 
range of different interpretations of the nation, and emphasize the aspects which 
would mobilize more voters in their favor. The fact that Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov 
came from two parties with very different ideologies did not prevent them from 
uniting around the image of Russia as a strong state. The tactic of Yeltsin’s 
government to emphasize a civic identity was clearly not as popular among the 
voters. Nationalist issues were put on the agenda during democratic elections, thus 
they had an indirect impact on the decision to wage war. It seems, however, like 
Snyder misses out on a central aspect of the effect of nationalist rhetoric – it does in 
fact matter if the national identity is established or not prior to the democratization 
process.  This is not taken into account in the theory, but this analysis shows that the 
lack of an established national identity prevented the issue from dominating the 
public discourse. 
It was not the threatened elite which put nationalism on the political  agenda, rather it 
was the oppositional elite who used it to get support. When Yeltsin saw that this 
tactic was popular with the voters, he changed his own policies, not by participating 
in the discourse, but by changing the composition of government, and thus moving 
his policies in a more hard-line, patriotic direction. His reaction to the threat posed by 
the opposition was thus to adopt a strategy which was more similar to the political 
goals of the nationalist opposition, and less similar to his own liberal position. It 
seems obvious that the internal changes within government came as a result of the 
elections, and the need for Yeltsin to show muscles.  
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After the relationship with Tatarstan had been decided with a treaty, Chechnya 
remained the most problematic region for Russia to deal with. It seems like Yeltsin’s 
new entourage persuaded him that a military attack would be a clever move in this 
situation, and that this made him more prone to accept the use of military force. The 
decision to wage war on Chechnya could thus be defended by a determination “to 
protect the Russian territorial integrity.” No institutional mechanisms had been 
established to deal with conflicts between the central government and the regions. 
Other means, such as negotiations, had been used in other regions to stabilize 
frictions  and to achieve territorial integrity, but these were ad hoc and not permanent 
institutions. Institutions which could have mediated or served as buffers between the 
leaderships of Russia and Chechnya were absent, and the consequence was that their 
differences of opinion became too immense to manage. Instead Yeltsin reached for 
extreme measures.  
The real motivation behind the war was thus more likely the desire to win voters in 
the next round of presidential elections. According to Snyder (2000: 51) the first 
problem the nationalist elites face is to create a possibility for effective collective 
action on a national scale. Yeltsin tried to use the war in Chechnya as a national 
project of this type, to regain support from the Russian population.16 The failure of 
this attempt is obvious today, but that doesn’t prevent this from being the motivation. 
The democratization process did not prevent the outbreak of war. Rather it 
encouraged conflict. 
 
16 McFaul (1997: 31) writes that one could, following Snyder’s theoretical assumptions, expect these 
developments in Russia to lead to the outbreak of an international war, which they did not. He criticizes 
Snyder’s theory on this basis, and claims that the theory does not hold. Russia had other motivations to avoid 
war with another country which falls outside the theory, such as economic dependency. Yet, he agrees with 
Snyder that the incomplete democratization process was one of the reasons why Russia waged war in 
Chechnya, and that the war probably would not have occurred if Russia was a consolidated democracy. His 
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5. The Chechen side  
“How are we going to construct our state? There are, of course, international laws, but  without taking 
into account our national interests we will never reach full democracy, never become unified, and never 
be protected as individual citizens. (…) If our actions are condemned as illegal by international law, we 
shall correct our mistakes. Within ourselves we will find the strength to follow the road to democracy.” 
Dzhokhar Dudayev (1992) 
In Chechnya, the early democratization process allowed organizations to develop, 
and the marketplace of ideas opened for national issues to be publicized. The elites 
successfully took advantage of this, something they could do because a national 
identity already was established. The democratization and state-building efforts 
stagnated early in the 1990s, and democratic institutions were not functioning. Elite 
tensions contributed to further radicalization of the public debate.  
5.1 Institutional development in Chechnya 
In Chechnya like in the rest of Russia, the period following glasnost was 
characterized by the emergence of popular movements and the introduction of 
freedom of speech. The press started to criticize the authorities, and religion was no 
longer banned. Unlike in Moscow, where mobilization was primarily politically 
based, the Chechens demanded respect for their local culture and historical heritage 
in addition to democratic institutions. Those who put forward such national claims 
were in opposition to the communist party, which was soon marginalized in 
Chechnya. In 1989 the first ethnic Chechen, Doku Zavgaev, was appointed head of 
the local branch of the communist party (Gall and De Waal, 1997: 80). The decision 
to install him came as a reaction to the demands for more local power in Chechnya, 
but he was against the division of the Union into sovereign states, and supported 
Gorbachev’s attempts to reform the Union. Many representatives of the intellectual 
and political elite of Russia stimulated and supported the Chechen demands for 
sovereignty (Tishkov, 1997: 225). The liberals supported the new claims for 
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sovereignty on an ethnic basis, as this legitimized their own fight for the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. Chechnya’s national independence was thus prepared and 
legitimized partly by Russian ideology and political practice in this period. Yeltsin 
even encouraged local elites to “take all the sovereignty you can swallow”, motivated 
by firm belief in a deconstruction of the union into democratic states (Lapidus, 1998: 
12). This was part of the reason why Russia did not interfere heavily in 1990. The 
new Chechen elite, however, went much further in their demands for autonomy than 
what Yeltsin had anticipated.  
The Chechen Revolution 
The Popular Front, which was established in 1988, had orchestrated the first protests 
against Soviet rule, but had moderate aims (Lieven, 1998: 57). The Popular Front 
disintegrated in 1990, and instead more radical political parties started to develop 
(Wilhelmsen, 1999: 53). Some of them were based on a Muslim identity. The 
Vainakh Democratic party, led by Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, was the first party with 
branches in almost every village 17(Gall and De Waal, 1997: 91). Snyder claims that 
unconditional freedom of public debate in newly democratizing countries gives an 
opportunity to populist myth makers to take control of the public discourse, which 
can serve to strengthen nationalist attitudes in the population. In Chechnya, the 
opening of the marketplace of ideas allowed a flow of previously hidden information 
to reach the public. The fight for independence was a main topic in the public sphere, 
and incidents from the deportation were for the first time discussed publicly. One 
example was the Khaibakh massacre, where several hundred women, children, 
elderly and sick people considered be too weak to travel the long distance to 
Kazakhstan, were burnt alive inside a barn. Material about Khaibakh was published 
for the first time in Grozny in 1989 (Gall and De Waal, 1997: 64-68). 18 The 
 
17 Vainakh is a common name for the Chechens and the Ingush, and are said to be the ancestors of a lot of ethic groups in 
North Caucasus (Lieven, 1998: 59).  
18 Information about this episode was hidden in Soviet times, but has later been documented interviews with survivors. See 
for example http://www.tjetjenien.dk/deportation/khaibakh.html, 
http://iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=161583&apc_state=hruicrs2004  
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increased focus on the deportation, and appeals to the injured collective dignity of the 
Chechen people, led to a massive mobilization around Chechen nationalism. 
In the summer of 1990 a group of Chechens, led by the businessman Lechi 
Umkhayev, organized the Chechen National Congress (From now on referred to as 
the Congress). With this move the construction of Chechnya as an autonomous entity 
had begun. The goal was to unite different nationalist groups in order to put pressure 
on the local leadership to claim more autonomy (Gall and De Waal, 1997: 82-82). 
Around 1000 delegates, both from Chechnya and from the Chechen diaspora, took 
part when the Congress met in November 1990. A new political figure emerged on 
stage at the Congress - Dzhokhar Dudayev, who had never lived in Chechnya, but 
was an ethnic Chechen and a former general of the Soviet air force. As a member of a 
relatively small and insignificant teip, and as a man who had always lived outside 
Chechnya, he was a good compromise candidate for the representatives of larger, 
rival clans, followings and interest groups in the Congress, and he was elected leader 
at its first assembly (Lieven, 1998: 58). The Congress was an ad hoc institution, but 
aside from some protests by the Communist party, it was seen as uncontroversial in 
the Chechen population. It managed to pressure the Supreme Soviet in Chechnya to 
declare independence in November 1990. This first declaration was not unique, as 
many other regions of Russia made similar statements in this period, but it permitted 
the Chechens  to denounce decisions from the centre which contradicted local 
interests (Wilhelmsen, 1999: 53). Snyder writes about how new democratic 
institutions in the beginning usually are too weak  to replace institutions of the 
previous regime, because each group is taking care of its own interests, without 
sufficient power or motive to take into consideration the outcome for society as a 
whole. In the longer run, the fragile unity of the coalition in the Congress made this 
institution weak. 
Dudayev takes power 
Dudayev aimed to turn the Congress into a radical political movement. After its 
second assembly in June 1991, radicals made up the majority (Gall and De Waal, 
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1997: 92). By autumn the Congress had taken over the power of Chechnya. The 
Supreme Soviet was discredited and had lost legitimacy early in the process. It had 
minimal impact on later political developments in Chechnya. A clear illustration of 
this is that Zavgaev was in Moscow during the August 1991 coup, and did not 
condemn it or make any public statement, while Dudayev immediately organized 
protests that turned into a huge and militant crowd. In September Zavgayev was 
physically forced to sign an ‘act of abdication’ (Gall and De Waal, 1997: 93-96). The 
passivity of the Communist party allowed the new elite to hijack the political sphere 
and they were supported by the population. The Congress was thus entirely in charge 
of the presidential and parliamentary elections held in October 1991. Dudayev won 
against three opponents, who were without credibility 19 (Gall and De Waal, 1997: 
98). Nationalist groups captured all the seats in the parliamentary elections (Lieven, 
1998: 63). The installation of the new regime in Chechnya happened dramatically, 
but gave Dudayev authority. This process reflects how the new elite took advantage 
of the weak institutional framework to come to power. Their will to actually follow 
democratic rules was not very strong later in the process. In a sense, the establishment 
of central government came early in Chechnya, but the actors in the process could 
only cooperate as long as they had a common enemy to struggle against. It was the 
power holders themselves who had constructed the institutions. In Snyder’s theory 
this point of departure is dangerous because it leaves the institutions open for 
manipulation.    
Autonomy, but no authority 
On 1 November 1991 Dudayev stated in his first decree as president that Chechnya 
was an independent state, and this time the declaration appeared more of a threat 
against Russian territorial integrity. The Russian government consequently declared a 
state emergency in Chechnya. At this stage Dudayev and the parliament stood united 
 
19 At this stage, Ruslan Khasbulatov, the ethnic Chechen speaker of the Russian Duma, supported Dudayev in taking over 
power (Gall and De Waal, 1997: 96). This is interesting to note in light of later developments of the relationship between 
these two. As we will see later, Khasbulatov came back to challenge Dudayev’s power base in 1994  
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against Russian demands. The parliament met in an emergency session and granted 
Dudayev the mandate to ‘defend the sovereignty of Chechnya’. He started to 
mobilize fighters, and was inaugurated as president the next day (Gall and De Waal, 
1997: 101).  The Russians agreed to pull their troops out, and no confrontation 
occurred at this stage, something Russian policy makers have regretted in retrospect. 
An intervention at this stage could have been more effective for the Russians, since 
the Chechens had not had much time to mobilize militarily. Huge amounts of 
weaponry were now left behind by the Russian forces, and Dudayev’s forces 
managed to seize most of the weapons as the troops withdrew. The Chechens could 
also buy weapons from corrupt Russian troops on the black market (Gall and De 
Waal, 1997: 113). The arming of the supporters of secession was, however, a process 
not always controlled by Dudayev himself (Tishkov, 1997: 207). Later, when local 
military groupings began to arise, they were armed with these weapons. The 
government had no control over the distribution of these weapons, and this clearly 
illustrates how institutional weaknesses facilitate violent conflict. 
In 1992 there were some modest attempts at building a Chechen state. The parliament 
proved a lively debating chamber and the press was vigorous and uncensored. The 
problem was that Dudayev and others in the leadership seemed more interested in 
calling Chechnya independent than in the practical measures required to build a state. 
In addition to this, he wanted all economic power to remain with the state (Gall and 
De Waal, 1997: 106-107). Dudayev had given leading political positions to his aides 
from the revolution, which meant that these positions often were to secure gains such 
as control over money flows and not to promote political reforms. This did not 
increase the  credibility of democratic institutions, but rather discredited them. 
Dudayev himself was in the beginning more of a front figure, but moved to a central 
position, and took more power than what he initially was given from the parliament. 
His group of aides consisted of a group of people who used their positions to gain 
weapons and money. This was later used to fight against Dudayev himself (Gall and 
De Waal, 1997: 108). 
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The chief ideologist of the Congress was Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who had also 
founded the Vainakh Democratic Party. Yaragi Mamodayev, a wealthy oil 
businessman with mafia links, became prime minister in Dudayev’s government 
(Lieven, 1998: 59). Beslan Gantemirov was from the same teip as Mamodayev, and 
commanded his own paramilitary organization - Islamic path. He became the mayor 
of Grozny. Together with Mamodayev he was at the top of a criminal network. 
Yusup Soslambekov was also a businessman with suspicious links. In addition he 
was a born orator, and hence very useful in the mobilization of the population (Gall 
and De Waal, 1997: 92). Snyder’s theory describes how elites not only take 
advantage of the weakness of institutions, but also deliberately weaken them in order 
to strengthen their own position. In Chechnya it seemed obvious from the start that 
some were more interested in personal gains than in the overall political 
development. By giving these persons leading posts in government, Dudayev not 
only weakened the ability of the state to introduce further democratic institutions. He 
also weakened the ability of the population to influence the decision making 
processes, such as the decision to mobilize violently against Russia.  
A constitution was mapped out to secure a tripartite division of power, between a 
legislative, executive and judiciary branch. Dudayev continued to dominate the 
political arena, however, and the division of power did not function in practice. A 
report by the organization International Alert in October 1992 pointed to the 
widespread dissatisfaction with Dudayev's rule due to the lack of economic reform, 
his government’s arbitrary politics, and lacking understanding for the necessity |of 
opposition criticism and complexities of building democratic government (Tishkov, 
1997: 208). In 1993, Chechnya was turning into a so-called failed state, in which the 
central authority cannot provide security to its citizens and lacks control over its 
territory and the administrative resources to keep its country running smoothly.20 
Instead, competing warlords and paramilitary groupings mobilized against the 
 
20  In their discussion of the term “failed state”, Maass and Mepham(2004: 5) emphasize the lack of will or ability by the 
government to provide the citizens with basic goods and security, and they measure state failure along a continuum. 
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government, which in turn was highly dependant on the black economy instead of tax 
revenues. A combination of poor control by the government over weapon flows and a 
population tired of deteriorating living standards laid the basis for a violent 
mobilization against Dudayev. Gall and De Waal (1997: 106) describe the developing 
anarchic condition like this: “Chechnya was not so much an independent country as a 
twilight zone, neither inside Russia nor outside it (…) From the summer 1992 there 
were no Russian troops in the republic (…) Instead there were plenty of gunmen in 
camouflage who could have belonged to anyone, but appeared to be defending 
President Dudayev.” Snyder’s theory stresses that the combination of weak 
institutions and a population willing to mobilize creates a dangerous situation. In 
Chechnya, the flow of weapons further increased the potential for a violent conflict to 
erupt. Later we will see how Dudayev disregarded the parliament, and thus weakened 
the power of this branch. There was no institutional mechanism at work to prevent 
the executive from making decisions against the will of the parliament, and the 
situation resembled in this respect the situation in Russia. The lack of checks and 
balances on the power of the president was a major institutional weakness in 
Chechnya as well. 
Low legitimacy of formal institutions 
The new elite in Chechnya had problems establishing stable power institutions. One 
way of explaining this, is the weak authority of formal institutions in Chechnya, also 
during Soviet rule. The Chechens had maintained their traditional structures as 
relevant in decision making processes alongside, or even above, the formal Party 
structures. Teip membership ties a Chechen to a large extended family, almost like a 
clan, and to an ancestral piece of land. For a long time, this has been the main unit of 
identification for Chechens, and there are more than 150 teips in Chechnya (Gall and 
De Waal, 1997: 26-27). Chechen customary law, adat, governs the relationships 
within the teip, and has traditionally been an important element in organizing 
Chechen society (Mannes, 1998: 36). When the Soviet structures disappeared, these 
were more or less replaced with these traditional networks, although these structures 
have also developed over time. The point is that minimal emphasis was put on 
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introducing new, formal institutions. The teip structure also played a role in the 
competition between different elites by being the basis of the constituencies of 
different warlords. The role of the teip will be discussed further in the chapter on 
national mobilization.  
5.2 Elite competition in Chechnya 
The new elite consisted of a wide variety of different persons, representing different 
interests and opinions about the future of Chechnya. We have seen how they were 
united in the beginning. This put heavy pressure on  the Supreme Soviet of the 
Communist party, which was soon removed from power. When Dudayev had 
consolidated his power however, the different fractions of the elite started to drift 
apart.  
A fragmented elite  
Dudayev did not tolerate any form of opposition to his rule, and made several 
attempts to remove actors in opposition to his rule from the political arena. He thus 
appeared as what Snyder terms a threatened elite. Especially in the period 1992-1993 
his grip on power was weakened. The Russian government meanwhile held a low 
profile towards Chechnya and did not interfere. Instead it closed all communication, 
except oil transport, making the economic situation in Chechnya extremely difficult. 
Dudayev attempted to get international recognition for Chechnya as an independent 
state, but despite meetings with numerous high-ranking officials he did not succeed. 
The first serious challenge to Dudayev’s rule came in March 1992, when armed men 
tried to take over the television centre in Grozny (Gall and De Waal, 1997: 110-114). 
When the parliament called for a referendum to decide the form of power in June 
1992, Dudayev dissolved it and introduced direct presidential rule (Tishkov, 1997: 
208). This illustrates how the elite not only took advantage of the institutions, but 
also consciously weakened them. Dudayev had emerged as part of a new and 
successful elite, but when his position became threatened, he had to change tactics. 
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Snyder’s claim that elite competition is dangerous when the institutions are weakly 
established thus fits well with the development in Chechnya. 
By 1993 the previously united elite had divided into fractions, most of them in 
opposition to Dudayev. After the opposition had entered into politics, the Chechen 
conflict acquired an internal dimension in addition to the external one. Sporadic 
internal clashes threatened to turn into a full-blown civil war and made the situation 
increasingly unstable (Trenin and Malashenko, 2004: 20). The elite split for different 
reasons, one of them being that they represented very different interests to start with. 
When Dudayev’s government failed to produce economic improvements and other 
results, a general discontent spread in the elite. In turn this led to an explosive 
atmosphere, and because of the quantity of weapons available it was easy to mobilize 
the different groups. Dudayev was in a sense an ‘outsider’ in Chechen politics, 
competing with more established elites and teip leaders. As his government failed to 
produce the promised results, people turned to other leaders and warlords. 
Dudayev looses his grip on power 
In April 1993, a majority of parliamentary deputies appeared ready to support an 
impeachment motion against Dudayev, and the opposition launched a series of mass 
protests. Dudayev responded to the protests by declaring presidential curfew, 
dissolving the parliament and crushing the opposition by force (Lieven, 1998: 79). 
The constitutional court declared the dissolution unconstitutional, but Dudayev 
reacted by declaring the court itself dissolved (Trenin and Malashenko, 2004: 20). 
This is almost parallel with the events in Moscow, where Yeltsin also dissolved the 
parliament in an attempt to limit its influence. Dudayev undermined the legitimacy of 
both the parliament and the constitutional court in desperation to keep his position. 
By this stage, Dudayev had fallen out with most of the allies who had helped him to 
power, with the exception of Yandarbiyev. His other former co-revolutionaries 
Gantemirov, Mamodayev and Soslambekov had all joined the opposition (Lieven, 
1998: 75). When this group abandoned Dudayev, he was left in a weak position, and 
became increasingly paranoid. Lieven (1998: 77) claims that parts of the Chechen 
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opposition had economic motivations for seeking compromise with Russia, and that 
they did not genuinely support a sovereign Chechen state. One reason for their 
opposition was that Dudayev rejected to sign a federation treaty with Russia. The 
Russian side made some half-hearted attempts at negotiation, but it seemed obvious 
that their primary goal was to oust Dudayev from power, and not to build equal 
relationship with the Chechens. Dudayev therefore stopped the negotiations and 
claimed that “no political agreements with Russia are possible!” (Gall and De Waal, 
1997: 118). 
The conflict between Dudayev and the opposition became increasingly serious in 
May 1993 when parliament removed Dudayev from office, and appointed 
Mamodayev the new prime minister (FBIS-SOV-93-091, 13 May 1993). Dudayev 
tried to regain his position, for example by appealing to elders in the teips, knowing 
that they had symbolic value for the population (Lieven, 1998: 343). The opposition 
wanted a referendum on 5 June 1993, but the day before Dudayev struck a violent 
attack, led by the radical fighter Shamil Basayev, where at least 17 people were killed 
(Gall and De Waal, 1997: 119-120). This was the first mass bloodshed in Chechnya, 
and from then onward most overt opposition to Dudayev was violent. Wilhelmsen 
(1999: 75) claims that the presence of an opposition pushed Dudayev in a more 
radical and nationalist direction than if his grip on power had been more permanent. 
The intense elite struggle and the lack of mechanisms to deal with opposing and 
diverging opinions thus contributed to Dudayev’s radicalization.21  
Internal aggression turns into war 
It was not only fragmentation of the government which made the power struggle in 
Chechnya more intense. Actors not previously involved in the political game also 
 
21 Some choose to explain Dudayev’s actions as consequences of his personality. Dudayev was a military man, 
not a politician, and for him all signs of compromise with the enemy meant defeat. Explanations based on 
personal traits yet appear too simple to explain a very complex picture. But Dudayev’s personality certainly did 
not contribute to dampen the conflicts either.  
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tried to take advantage of the anarchic situation for own gains. In 1994, after some 
period of isolating Chechnya, the Russian government attempted to dampen the 
internal conflict in Chechnya by installing a Russia-friendly leader. Russia did not 
accept the Dudayev regime, but pursued a split-and-rule tactic to oust Dudayev from 
power. As the political and economic situation in Chechnya began to deteriorate in 
1994, hard-line segments of the Russian leadership sought to exploit the growing 
political cleavages within Chechnya to vilify the “criminal regime” in Grozny, 
challenge the legitimacy of Dudayev’s rule, and unify opposition figures around a 
campaign to unseat him. Sergei Shakhrai was a leading advocate of the strategy of 
isolating Dudayev, he argued that the installation of a more Russia-friendly leader 
could settle the Chechens and discourage their attempts at independence. Umar 
Avturkhanov, who headed a provisional council, was given Moscow’s full support as 
“the only legitimate power structure in Chechnya” (Lapidus, 1998: 16-18). The 
northern part of Chechnya was in control of Avturkhanov, Soslambekov and 
Gantemirov at this stage, and they joined forces to take back Grozny as well (Trenin 
and Malashenko, 2004: 20). By interfering in the internal Chechen power struggle, 
Moscow thus contributed to an intensification of the conflict between different 
fractions. The former Soviet establishment in Chechnya was solidly against Dudayev, 
and they were increasingly joined by the intelligentsia (Lieven, 1998: 79). In 
addition, Ruslan Khasbulatov, the former speaker of the Russian Duma, who had 
fought his own battle with Yeltsin in Moscow, returned to Chechnya in 1994 and 
staged a massive campaign for support (Tishkov, 1997: 216). Khasbulatov had, 
despite helping Dudayev to power, later been frozen out by the Dudayev 
government(Gall and De Waal, 1997: 114).22  Ruslan Labazanov, who had been 
Dudayev’s bodyguard, broke with him in 1994, and provided armed protection for 
 
22 Mannes (1998: 76) argues that if the Russian government had supported Khasbulatov’s bid for power, the 
Dudayev regime might have been peacefully toppled. Khasbulatov, unlike Dudayev, belonged to a well-
respected teip, and his resistance against Yeltsin had made him very popular in his Chechen homeland. Support 
by Moscow was, however, extremely unlikely, as he at this point was viewed as a criminal because of the coup 
attempt in 1993. Such speculations are thus not very fruitful to elaborate on.  
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Khasbulatov instead (Lieven, 1998: 31). The fighting between the forces of Dudayev 
and Labazanov was particularly intense. 
Compromise between the different fractions seemed very distant. The situation 
resembled civil war. Crime rates were high and  political anarchy prevailed. Only 
when the Russians intervened to bring back order to the republic, the warlords 
decided to unite in the struggle against a common enemy. Dudayev chose a tactic to 
regain control which involved appeals to national claims. This was successful, and 
the popular support for him increased in the period immediately before the war 
(Wilhelmsen, 1999: 76). This is exactly what Snyder talks about: When the elite feels 
threatened, it becomes desperate to gather support, and tries to convince the 
population to follow its political direction. Dudayev was desperate to regain control. 
In this situation he needed to unify support for his cause and against a common 
enemy. Dudayev chose nationalism, and the split in the elite contributed to pushing 
him in a more radical direction. The temporary institutional framework which 
allowed Dudayev to come to power was not robust enough to prevent the negative 
consequences of divisions among the elite.  
5.3 Nationalist mobilization in Chechnya 
Unlike in Russia, the Chechens immediately turned to nationalist rhetoric during  
glasnost. Many of the organizations and papers that appeared in this period argued, as 
we have seen, for a revival of Chechen culture and habits. There were probably two 
motives behind the appeals to the national identity in Chechnya. On the one hand, the 
opening of society allowed nationalist issues to enter the public space, and some 
argue that suppressed Chechens used this opportunity to speak freely about their 
culture and history. On the other hand, the political elite could use this opportunity 
strategically, to better position themselves and their collaborators in the future 
struggle for power in the republic. This chapter deals mainly with the second group, 
without dismissing the first as insignificant. Dudayev actively used nationalist 
rhetoric to mobilize support. When he entered the political stage in the early 1990s, 
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the nationalist discourse was, however, well established. Dudayev chose to pursue 
this line of mobilization rather than to mobilize around other issues. This is thus an 
example of successful use of nationalist rhetoric. 
A resistant nation  
There is a huge number of small ethnic groups in the Caucasus. The primary loyalty 
of Chechens has traditionally been at the local level, and the mobilization of a 
national identity was formed in opposition to Russian offensives (Evangelista, 2002: 
13). The identity is mainly built around the Chechens as a proud, but victimized 
people, willing to strike back against the Russians. The collective memory of 
deportation and suppression by the Russians is the most important component of 
Chechen national identity (Wilhelmsen, 1999: 72). 
The Caucasian wars in the 18th and 19th centuries are frequently referred to by the 
nationalists. Dudayev did, for example, claim that “The bloody Caucasian wars have 
shown what a unified Chechen people is capable of when we are fighting for our 
freedom and independence” (Dudayev, 1992). Chechen culture values highly the 
ability to fight, and in traditional folklore those who dare to stand up against a 
stronger enemy are praised (Mannes, 1998: 89). Imam Shamil is a central figure for 
the Chechens, although he was an ethnic Avar, which is another North-Caucasian 
people, residing mostly in Dagestan. Legendary tales about how he defended 
Chechen soil against the Russian intruders have made him a hero in Chechen history 
and national myth. The events of the Caucasian wars were, however, not fully 
brought into a common Chechen identity until the deportation of 1944. This is 
because a widespread, conscious sense of belonging to a common nation probably 
evolved among the Chechens with the deportation. Before that it was more relevant 
for the Chechens to identify with the teip. The Chechen nation was in a way born as a 
result of the tactic that was meant to destroy it. The deportation is quite recent, and 
the oldest members of the population still have memories from that time. Many who 
were born in exile in Kazakhstan returned to Chechnya later, or kept strong bonds 
with their relatives. The teip structure did not disappear, but was rather strengthened 
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in this period. The preservation of strong teip structures and group identity was 
facilitated by the relatively low level of industrialization of the republic and the 
correspondingly low level of Russian settlement (Lapidus, 1998: 10). Lieven (1998: 
342) argues that the teip has lost its significance, and that it plays only a very limited 
part in determining Chechen’s political behavior. It seems likely that the teip was the 
glue keeping the Chechens together in the difficult years of the deportation, and thus 
was the building block of national unity. Gall and De Waal (1997: 74) write that “The 
collective anger about the deportation was the most emotive element in a rich brew of 
nationalism as the Chechens started to invent themselves as a nation”. After the 
Second World War the Chechens were often portrayed by the authorities as betrayers 
and criminals. This strengthened the Chechen self image as a ”punished people”, and 
prepared the ground for the elite to mobilize around national claims.  
Islam is an important element of Chechen nationalism, but its significance in the 
immediate post-Soviet period is often overestimated. In the early 1990s Islam did not 
in itself constitute a motivation for the anti-Russian rebellion (Radnitz, 2006: 246). 
Insofar as the Chechen independence struggle has taken on a religious coloring, this 
was mainly because Islam is seen, even by irreligious Chechens, as an integrated part 
of the national tradition and of the nation’s past struggles against Russian domination 
(Lieven, 1998: 357). In Dudayev’s pre-election program of October 1991 there is 
almost nothing about Islam or even about religion in general. It was only in the 
autumn of 1994 the rhetoric of Islam became insistent (Lieven, 1998: 363). As 
religion was basically seen as an integrated part of the Chechen nation, and not 
particularly addressed in the mobilization before the war, it will not be discussed 
more thoroughly here. 
A constructed nation? 
Tishkov (2004: 10) claims that the Chechens’ cultural similarity to the rest of 
Russia’s population, is far greater than what separates them. The Chechen national 
identity was almost “constructed” in the period of political mobilization of the late 
1980s according to Tishkov. While the Chechens, like all ethnic groups within the 
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Soviet Union, became more conscious about their national identity with the 
disintegration of the Union, it is misleading to say that the Chechen nation was 
constructed in this period. It is more accurate to say that a common Chechen identity 
has evolved gradually, on basis of historical events, cultural traits and mobilization 
by elites. The constructivist view of Tishkov is shared by some, but this thesis argues 
in line with those who see a consistent pattern in the development of the Chechen 
nation, and tie it up with previous identities. Mannes (1998: 13) argues that common 
cultural traits were established already before the Soviet Union, and that a Chechen 
ethnie, a shared history and a sense of solidarity, was established before 1917. This 
observation is in line with Smith’s interpretation of the nation.  
Lieven (1998: 332) argues that Russia was the catalyst which set off the chemical 
reaction out of which the contemporary Chechen national identity ultimately 
developed: by trying to conquer the Chechens it thereby encouraged them to adopt 
institutions and strategies of resistance. Wilhelmsen (1999: 122) finds a pattern in the 
way Chechens have protested against the center – they have always responded with 
violent resistance. What differed in the late 1980s and early 1990s from earlier times, 
was the high degree of freedom of speech. This gave room for articulation and 
promotion of nationalistic demands. The media had not previously been used as an 
arena for nationalism, and now the potential for outreach to the public was enormous. 
The institutional changes which came with the democratization process laid the 
ground for a massive national mobilization in Chechnya. The nation was not created 
in the process of democratization, but had a solid foundation to build on, which in 
turn was taken advantage of by political actors.  
Specific cultural and social qualities such as the language and historical memories 
have been emphasized and nourished by the nationalists after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, when the national identity flourished. In this respect the Chechen nation 
differs from the Russian nation, and this is in part the reason why the nationalist 
mobilization was so successful here. The Chechens had several clear historical events 
to mobilize around and the nation was latent already before the articulation of 
nationalism. Nationalism in the 1990s was used strategically. Yet, the nation as such 
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has strength beyond the ideological use of it, and is thus more robust than the Russian 
nation. Tishkov’s argumentation is weak, because it confuses the Chechen nation and 
the post-Soviet Chechen nationalism. While the nationalism evolved with the 
political opening under Soviet Union, the development of the nation had started 
earlier.  
Dudayev’s argumentation  
Dudayev and his forerunners had concentrated their mobilization around the idea of 
Chechens as a ‘punished nation’.23 Glasnost had released anger over the deportation, 
and Dudayev could continue to use this anger to mobilize (Wilhelmsen, 1999: 74). 
The extensive mobilization around nationalism was made possible by the opened 
marketplace of ideas, and would not have been possible before glasnost. Recall how 
Snyder in his theory emphasizes that nationalists often portray other nations as more 
threatening and  more blameworthy for historic wrongs than they really are. The elite 
in Chechnya referred extensively to the deportation and other historical grievances in 
order to mobilize the population against Russia. This mobilization started before 
Dudayev entered the stage, but his entrance into politics marked a milestone in the 
history of the Chechen conflict. Tishkov (1997: 200) puts it like this: “Like any 
nationalism, Chechen nationalism needed a ‘leader of the nation’ to express its will 
and interests.”  
In one interview Dudayev said  “There have always been difficult times for our 
people. Throughout our history, troubles have forced suffering upon us without fail. 
And I believe the heaviest time will come now.” He went on to claim that 
democratization brings the right of secession for the Chechens, justifying the fight for 
independence: “It now appears that the prospects for development of democracy will 
allow us to (…) revive our culture and fantastic national customs.“ In another 
interview, he underlined the strength of the Chechen people to resist Russian 
 
23 The quotes by Dudayev used here are from a number of interviews and speeches Dudayev made in 1991, which are 
collected in a book (See Dudayev, 1992). 
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pressure: “We will win, because we are right, because the workers and the whole 
population follows us, and in this lies our strength, this is the source of invincibility 
for our people, going through massive transformations.” Dudayev frequently referred 
to the dream of independence, which he apparently had all his life, and shared with 
his fellow Chechens “All my conscious life I have dreamed of seeing an independent 
Chechen nation.” In another interview he said, referring to their historical struggle 
with the Russians and to speculations that Chechens are not capable of building their 
own state: “The Chechens know the price of freedom, and we are ready to start the 
work. We have the economic potential for this.” He was very clear on the role of the 
Russians – who in his view were constantly trying to undermine the peaceful attempts 
by the Chechens to take over power. In one interview commenting on the bad 
relationship between the Ingush and the Chechens he said “All conflicts between our 
brother nations evolve because Moscow provokes violent passions out of pure 
desire”. He also claimed that the Russians were preventing the Chechens from sorting 
out the differences in a peaceful manner “We could have gained power in the course 
of an hour, throwing out the Supreme Soviet and occupying their chairs. But we 
didn’t use methods of force. We wanted to come to power in a legal way. That’s why 
the process dragged out. We were practically forced to take power in the wrong way, 
to seize the legislature.” 
Dudayev portrayed the Chechens as a unified and peaceful nation, willing to do 
almost anything in their fight for independence. The Russians, on the other hand, 
were portrayed as obstructing these peaceful attempts, and thereby forcing the 
Chechens to take to arms. As the war was approaching, his appeals to take up arms 
against the enemy were more frequent, and more desperate. Eventually, his rhetoric 
could be characterized by calls for war rather than by arguments for national freedom.  
5.4 Discussion of findings 
The period following the sudden political independence of Chechnya was 
characterized by poor leadership and a fragmented elite. The analysis shows that 
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events in the early democratization process contributed to the development of a 
situation where extreme nationalism was applied to mobilize against the Russian 
enemy. 
The national mobilization came earlier and was stronger in Chechnya than in Russia, 
and the new elite moved quickly to fill the power-vacuum after the Soviet demise. 
The elite could use this to mobilize the population around national demands. 
Tensions among the elite emerged soon, however, and threatened to destroy the 
fragile unity which was based on the resistance against Russian rule. Democratization 
is a somewhat misleading term to use when describing the political developments in 
Chechnya after the fall of the Soviet Union. After a short while the 
institutionalization practically stagnated, and few signs of actual democratization 
were present. But in the beginning there was an opening of society, introduction of 
mass suffrage, freedom of speech and freedom of association. This was the point of 
departure for later political development. The early stage of democratization, 
combined with a weakly institutionalized state and internal strife, contributed to the 
development of circumstances under which a violent conflict was hard to prevent.  
The political opening which came under glasnost prepared the ground for new elites 
to emerge in Chechnya, and for new views to be expressed through the media. In line 
with the assumptions made in Snyder’s theory, this sudden opening of the 
marketplace of ideas permitted presentation of extreme views. The Chechens had a 
clear national identity to build on, and the new elite used nationalist rhetoric to 
mobilize in the early stages of democratization. Their focus was on national revival. 
The opening up of the marketplace of ideas was a prerequisite for the entrance of 
nationalist issues into public debate, but it would be incorrect to say that the new elite 
created the nationalist discourse. It is more precise to say that the new political elite 
took advantage of the nationalist discourse, and voiced demands which created 
certain expectations in the population. That way they could place themselves and 
their allies in a beneficial position when the distribution of power changed. The 
Chechen national identity was built on resistance against Russia from the beginning, 
and statements by Dudayev illustrate how he appealed to the will of Chechens to 
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strike back against the enemy. This rhetoric stipulated violent struggle as the only 
way to overcome the enemy, and Dudayev thus left himself with no other option than 
to use violence. No significant initiative was taken to negotiate with Russia, and one 
reason for this might be the extreme hate-image of Russia which was nurtured by 
Dudayev and other nationalists in the early democratization process. 
As mentioned in the theory chapter, there are different theoretical views on 
nationalist mobilization in the wake of a democratization process. While Snyder 
claims that “elite persuasion” is what mainly pushes the nationalist issues into the 
public debate, Byman and Van Evera hold that the democratization process as such 
does not generate nationalist sentiments, but can contribute to their entrance into the 
public debate. It seems like this view is more appropriate to use for the Chechen case, 
since national sentiments were present in advance. Snyder’s approach is, however, 
not entirely misleading, because the efforts made by the elite did contribute to 
strengthening Chechen nationalism and intensifying its demands.  
Different fractions of the new elite stood united in the Congress and in supporting 
Dudayev’s take-over. The coalition was fragile, however, and personal networks 
mattered more than formal power. Dudayev was supported by the nationalist-
dominated parliament against their common Russian enemy. After Russia had pulled 
out its troops in 1992 it proved harder for the Chechen government to administer the 
process of state-building, despite their de facto independence in this period. Once the 
enemy was defeated, and the Russians lost interest in the situation in Chechnya, 
internal splits made Chechnya difficult to control. The political development after this 
had little to do with democratization, and more to do with desperate competition for 
power. As a threatened elite, Dudayev acted according to the theoretical assumptions 
made by Snyder. He desperately tried to outmaneuver other democratic institutions, 
and thus discredited them. His actions revealed that his ambitions were contrary to 
democratic ideals of power sharing and popular control over the executive branch. 
Both Dudayev and other members of the new elite did what they could to undermine 
the strength of the institutions, and secure their personal power base. Snyder’s theory 
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claims that elite competition will lead to a weakening, not strengthening, of 
democratic institutions. The lack of institutionalization of the regime and mechanisms 
dealing with diverging opinions led to a violent internal conflict. In turn, the violent 
mobilization was directed against the Russians. The resistance against a common 
enemy was what eventually could reunite the Chechens. 
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6. Conclusion 
6.1 Results of the analysis 
The political developments in Russia and Chechnya after independence were to a 
large extent shaped by events early in the democratization process. At the outset, it 
seemed like a more democratic system was emerging. In the long run, an 
environment was created in which a violent conflict could develop.  
The opening of the marketplace of ideas during glasnost made it possible for all kinds 
of opinions to be voiced publicly. The public discourse in both Russia and Chechnya 
evolved around the opportunities for political change and democracy. Snyder’s 
theory assumes that a rapid opening of the marketplace of ideas will lead to the 
emergence of extreme opinions in the public sphere. To some degree the analysis 
supports the theoretical assumption that nationalism emerges when elites compete 
without clear guidelines in a process of democratization, but the differing degree to 
which nationalist demands were brought into the discourse in Russia and Chechnya 
reflects two things. First, that a national identity was more clearly established in 
Chechnya than in Russia. Second, that the elite which emerged in Chechnya was 
more interested in using this national identity rhetorically. Thus the level to which 
national identity has been developed does matter, and it seems sensible to take this 
into account in the theoretical framework. It can be expected that the opening of the 
marketplace of ideas will give different results in a country where national identity is 
well established, than in a country where it is largely undefined or where the existing 
identity is multiethnic in character. Snyder seems to underestimate this factor when 
he underlines the potential for “elite persuasion”. The elite in fact has much less 
opportunity to use nationalist rhetoric if national identity is weakly established, than 
if it is present before the onset of democratization. This has been demonstrated in the 
comparison of the Russian and Chechen democratization processes. However if the 
institutional framework is fragile, a weakly defined nation can be mobilized by 
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nationalist rhetoric. The level of development of national identity thus seems to have 
had an impact on the timing of its entrance into the public discourse, and not so much 
on its potential for impacting on policy making. The elite can exploit national identity 
to mobilize voters regardless of whether the identity is strong or weak. In Chechnya 
the nationalist rhetoric had a direct impact on the decision to go to war, because the 
nationalism was based on extremely negative images of Russia, and Dudayev’s 
rhetoric left him with no other option than to confront the enemy violently. In Russia 
the influence of nationalism was indirect, as the major impact of nationalist rhetoric 
came with the 1993 elections, and the result of the elections was what that pushed 
Yeltsin’s policies in a more patriotic direction. The lack of a common national 
identity was perhaps what discouraged the government from pursuing a nationalist 
line of mobilization, but in a longer perspective the nationalist discourse did influence 
the political decision-making in Russia as well. 
Like Snyder suggests in his theory, elite competition in an environment of inadequate 
institutionalization quickly turned into confrontation in both Russia and Chechnya. 
Changes in the administrative structures happened fast, and the marketplace of ideas 
was used as an arena for intensification of elite competition. In Chechnya, the 
fragmented composition of the Congress led to intense elite competition soon after it 
had taken power. In Russia, the old elite retained some influence through the 
parliament, and the president tried to limit their influence by ad hoc ways of 
circumventing the existing institutions. In the end, the old elite could use their 
position in the parliament to try to undermine the government and their reforms, both 
through political channels and through the media. The sequence of institutionalization 
was thus an obstacle to a proper democratization process as the central government 
had not been established prior to freedom of speech and association.  
Snyder points to the weakness of institutions in general, but in this analysis we have 
seen how the lack of a clear power division in both Russia and Chechnya was a 
particular weakness which intensified the conflict. Immediately after the fall of the 
Soviet Union the new elites in government had a solid power-base in both Russia and 
Chechnya. When the support for these elites diminished, they sought other means of 
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keeping power. In Russia, the lack of power division materialized in a strained 
relationship both between the parliament and the president, and between the center 
and the regions. This also led to a lack of mechanisms to deal with diverging 
opinions. While ad hoc solutions, such as presidential decrees, and selective 
bargaining with the regions did work for a limited period of time, these options were 
exhausted, and no proper mechanisms had been developed to take over their 
functions. The absence of institutions for the conduct of negotiations was critical in 
the relationship between Russia and Chechnya. If such institutions had been 
established, this could perhaps have prevented a full-scale war from breaking out. In 
addition, the negotiations Russia conducted with regions such as Tatarstan show that 
Chechnya did in fact have other options for dealing with the center in the pursuit of 
autonomy. These options were not taken advantage of by any of the parties, and this 
makes it appropriate to talk about the war as a “chosen confrontation”. 
The personal power of the presidents seems to be important, because the persons 
sitting in these positions became more influential than the institutions they were 
supposed to represent. Non-democratic means of keeping power were exercised both 
in Russia and Chechnya when the opposition became stronger, and through their 
actions the executives discredited institutions such as the parliament and the 
constitutional court. Yeltsin tried to outmaneuver an oppositional parliament by 
dissolving it, and Dudayev used violence to suppress opposition when the once-
friendly parliament turned against him. Both in Russia and Chechnya the presidents 
attempted to gain control by dismissing the parliament, but were instead pressured 
into accepting the increased influence of radical nationalism: Yeltsin because patriots 
gained substantial influence in the 1993 elections and Dudayev because he was 
challenged by various warlords, and used nationalism as a tool to win back support. 
Elites in opposition to the presidents were instrumental in pushing governmental 
policies in a radical direction. This illustrates how mechanisms for regulating 
disagreements between different actors were not sufficiently established, and how 
this had direct impact on the likelihood of violent behavior. In both places the 
executive gradually became more open to taking up arms against the other side. 
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There were no institutions to check the decisions made by the president, because the 
parliament had been discredited and thus did not play a significant role in the 
decision to go to war.   
The differences between Russia and Chechnya in the democratization process were 
many. Russia managed to pursue state building, while Chechnya did not manage this 
task at all. Nationalist rhetoric was much more dominating in the public discourse in 
Chechnya than in Russia, for reasons discussed above. Yet, the analysis has 
demonstrated how similar mechanisms related to the democratization process 
contributed to creating the environment in which a violent conflict could occur.  
6.2 Implications for this case 
The outbreak of the first Russo-Chechen war cannot be understood without reference 
to the democratization process. Without the political opening and the consequences 
of this, an environment in which conflict was nurtured would not have developed. 
But this does not mean that democratization is essentially dangerous and should be 
avoided. On the contrary, democratization can bring about positive changes, most 
significantly in terms of more popular control over political decision makers – if the 
end result is a functioning democracy. But there are many pitfalls on the way, and 
this thesis demonstrates how they can result in the outbreak of war. 
The significance of sequencing in institutional development must not be 
underestimated. Mikhail Gorbachev could have chosen a different path of 
democratization, for example by reorganizing the Communist Party structure before 
he introduced freedom of speech and assembly. Perhaps approaching the 
democratization process from another angle could have provided the political 
leadership with more control in the process, and the anarchic power competition that 
resulted could have been avoided. Gorbachev could also have chosen to involve 
international actors in his democratization efforts to a larger extent, for example by 
using advisors with a broad knowledge of democratization processes. These are 
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naturally only speculations, as it is impossible to say with any certainty how the 
outcome would have been if the process had been conducted differently. But the 
findings in this analysis suggest that a higher degree of control and knowledge of the 
mechanisms which operate during a democratization process would have been 
desirable in Russia and Chechnya. 
What seems obvious is that the international society made a mistake when they, 
almost unanimously, applauded the political processes in the Soviet Union and 
Russia in an uncritical manner. Western countries supported Boris Yeltsin’s regime 
mainly because they feared a communist backlash, and they did not understand the 
warning signs that  his discrediting of the new democratic institutions entailed. They 
chose to support a man who called himself a democrat, without placing more 
demands on his behavior. International actors could at least have tried to influence 
the process, and not be satisfied by the mere holding of elections. The Russo-
Chechen war came as a shock on the international society, but if they had followed 
the process more closely, they would probably not have been caught by surprise. 
With more involvement, the international society could perhaps even have helped 
avoid the war. 
6.3 Implications for future democratization processes 
As stated, the purpose of this thesis is not to draw conclusions regarding all cases 
similar to the one analyzed here. Some additional remarks will be made here as to 
how the results of this study can be used to further develop the theory of 
democratization and conflict. 
Seeing how influential the democratization process was in this case, one must ask 
how democratization processes in the future can be better managed to avoid the 
potential outbreak of violent conflict. It is for example important that mechanisms for 
dealing with diverging opinions are created before the opening of a public space. The 
holding of elections at an early stage is not necessarily a positive thing, because they 
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can serve as vehicles for nationalist mobilization. One has no guarantee that the 
winner of the elections will live by the democratic rules of the game once installed. 
The previous power holders will typically be more interested in making provisions 
for their own return to power, while new power holders will be more interested in 
making provisions for keeping power than actually attempting to make a democratic 
form of governance work. It is therefore crucial to establish a balance of power 
between different institutions as early as possible, making it possible for them to 
check the behavior of other institutions, and for the population to exercise influence 
through the institutions. That being said, it is difficult to control a democratization 
process once it has begun. Even though one in retrospect can claim that steps were 
taken prematurely, it can be extremely difficult to change the order of development at 
the time. It is therefore important to start off the democratization process in a fruitful 
manner.  
The lack of international involvement was characteristic of the Russian and Chechen 
democratization process. The international society should probably be more engaged 
in assisting new regimes in such processes. In major states, such as Russia, it can be 
difficult to exercise influence, but in smaller states pressure from the international 
society can be very effective. If outside actors can give advice on the process, and 
possibly offer guarantees which will decrease the conflict level, this can perhaps limit 
the ability of different elites to take advantage of weak institutions.  
The lesson must thus be that democratization is not negative per se, but that the 
democratization process can have unfortunate consequences. The challenge for 
participants in future democratization processes is thus to convince the actors 
involved to choose other ways to solve disagreements than through violent 
confrontation. 




List of references 
Adcock, Robert, and David Collier (1999). Democracy And Dichotomies: A Pragmatic 
Approach to Choices about Concepts. Annual Review of Political Science. 2(-1): 
537-565. 
 
Anderson, Benedict (2006). Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism. London: Verso. 
 
Benn, David Wedgwood (1996). The Russian Media in Post-Soviet Conditions. Europe-Asia 
Studies. 48(3): 471-479. 
 
Bransten, Jeremy (2001). USSR Breakup: Tracing The Collapse Of The World's Last Great 
Empire (Part 1). http://www.rferl.org/features/2001/12/14122001094030.asp 
Accessed 05.03.07  
 
Braumoeller, Bear F. (1997). Deadly Doves: Liberal Nationalism and the Democratic Peace 
in the Soviet Successor States. International Studies Quarterly. 41(3): 375-402. 
 
Brubaker, Rogers (1994). Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and 
Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account. Theory and Society. 23(1): 47-78. 
 
Byman, David, and Stephen Van Evera (1998). Why They Fight: Hypotheses on the Causes 
of Contemporary Deadly Conflict. Security Studies. 7(3): 1-51. 
 
Dahl, Ottar (1973). Grunntrekk i historieforskningens metodelære. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Dahl, Robert A. (1971). Polyarchy : Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale 
university press. 
 
De Nardo, James (1985). Power in Numbers. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Devold, Thomas A. (2000). Mot demokratisk konsolidering i Russland? : En studie av 
politisk kultur og demokratisering i det post-sovjetiske Russland. Oslo: NUPI. 
 
Doyle, Michael W. (1997). Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism. 
New York: Norton. 
 
Dudayev, Dzhokhar (1992). Тернистый путь к свободе [The Thorny way to Freedom]. 
Accessed 30.03.07 from 
www.chechenpress.info/ichkeria/history/ternisty/chast_2.shtml  
 
Evangelista, Matthew (2002). The Chechen Wars. Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet 
Union? Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
FBIS-SOV-93-057 (26. March 1993). Poll shows Yeltsin favored over Khasbulatov, Interfax 
Moscow. 
   
 87
 
FBIS-SOV-93-091 (13 May 1993). Chechen parliament removes Dudayev from 
government, Moscow Radio Rossii network. Moscow. 
 
Flikke, Geir (1999). Patriotic Left-Centrism: The Zigzags of the Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation. Europe-Asia Studies. 51(2): 275-298. 
 
Francisco, Ronald A. (1995). The Relationship between Coercion and Protest: An Empirical 
Evaluation in Three Coercive States. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 39(2): 263-82. 
 
Gall, Carlotta, and Thomas De Waal (1997). Chechnya : a Small Victorious War. London: 
Pan Books. 
 
Gellner, Ernest (1998). Nasjonalisme. Oslo: Spartacus. 
 
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development 
in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, and Håvard Hegre (1997). Peace and Democracy: Three Levels of 
Analysis. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 41(2): 283-310. 
 
Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001). Toward a 
Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992. 
The American Political Science Review. 95(1): 33-48. 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. (1991). The Third Wave : Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
 
Kipp, Jacob W. (1994). The Zhirinovsky Threat. Foreign Affairs. 73(3 May/June): 72-86. 
 
Kolstø, Pål (1999). Nasjonsbygging : Russland og de nye statene i øst. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Kryshtanovskaya, Olga, and Stephen White (1996). From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian 
Elite. Europe-Asia Studies. 48(5): 711-733. 
 
Lane, David (1996). The Transformation of Russia: The Role of the Political Elite. Europe-
Asia Studies. 48(4): 535-549. 
 
Lapidus, Gail W. (1998). Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya. International 
Security. 23(1): 5-49. 
 
Lieven, Anatol (1998). Chechnya : Tombstone of Russian Power. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Mannes, Siri Lill (1998). The Tale of the Wolf : the Development and Mobilisation of 
Chechen National Identity. Bergen: Universitetet. 
 
Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett (1993). Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic 
Peace, 1946-1986. The American Political Science Review. 87(3): 624-638. 
  88
 
McFaul, Michael (1995). Eurasia Letter: Russian Politics after Chechnya Foreign 
Policy(No. 99): 149-165. 
 
McFaul, Michael (1997). A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian 
Foreign Policy. International Security. 22(3): 5-35. 
 
Muller, Edward N., and Erich Weede (1990). Cross-National Variations in Political 
Violence: A Rational Action Approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 34(4): 624-
51. 
 
Maass, Gero, and David Mepham (2004). Promoting Effective States: A Progressive Policy 
Response to Failed and Failing States. London: Institute of Public Policy Research. 
 
NG (12. March 1993). Вялотекущая конфронтация переходит в клиническую стадию 
[The slow confrontation goes over to a clinical stage ], Nezavisimaya gazeta. p.1. 
Moscow. 
 
NG (16 February 1993). Коммунисты вновь становятся самой массовой партией смраны 
[Communists are again becoming the mass party of the country], Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta. p. 1. Moscow. 
 
NG (18 January 1994 ). Гайдар проиграл почти все. Хасбулатов, сидя в Лефортове, 
выиграл [Gaidar lost almost everything. Khasbulatov won, while sitting in 
Lefortovo] (Lefortovo is a prison in Moscow ), Nezavisimaya Gazeta. p. 1. Moscow. 
 
Nordlinger, Eric A. (1968). Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change. 
World Politics. 20(3): 494-520. 
 
NUPI (11. December 1994 ). Russian military intervention in Chechnya. 
http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?1015 Accessed 12.05.07  
 
NUPI (25.04.1993). Support for Yeltsin in referendum: NUPI Centre for Russian Studies. 
http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?907 Accessed 05.03.07  
 
O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
 
Radnitz, Scott (2006). Look who's talking! Islamic discourse in the Chechen wars. 
Nationalities Papers. 34(2): 237 - 256. 
 
Ray, James Lee (1995). Democracy and International Conflict: an Evaluation of the 
Democratic Peace Proposition. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
 
Remington, Thomas F. (2004). Politics in Russia. New York: Pearson/Longman. 
 
RFE/RL (20.03.1993). President Yeltsin announces "special rule": NUPI Centre for Russia 
studies. http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?2886 Accessed 05.03.07  
 
   
 89
Rose, Richard, and Neil Munro (2002). Elections Without Order: Russia's Challenge to 
Vladimir Putin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rustow, Dankwart A. (1970). Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. 
Comparative Politics. 2(3): 337-363. 
 
Sahin, Yossi, and Juan J. Linz (1995). Between States: Interim Governments and 
Democratic Transitions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sakwa, Richard (1993). Russian Politics and Society. London: Routledge. 
 
Sakwa, Richard (1995). The Russian Elections of December 1993. Europe-Asia Studies. 
47(2): 195-227. 
 
Sakwa, Richard (2002). Russian Politics and Society 3rd edition. London: Routledge. 
 
Smith, Anthony D. (2001). Nationalism : Theory, Ideology, History. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Snyder, Jack (2000). From Voting to Violence : Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. 
New York: Norton. 
 
Snyder, Jack, and Karen Ballentine (1996). Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas. 
International Security. 21(2): 5-40. 
 
Snyder, Jack, and Edward D. Mansfield (1995). Democratization and the Danger of War. 
International Security. 20(1): 5-38. 
 
Snyder, Jack, and Edward D. Mansfield (2002). Democratic Transitions, Institutional 
Strength, and War. International Organization. 56(2): 297-337. 
 
Snyder, Jack, and Edward D. Mansfield (2005). Electing to Fight. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Solnick, Steven (1998). Will Russia Survive? Center and Periphery in the Russian 
Federation. In B.R. Rubin, and J. Snyder (Eds.), Post-Soviet Political Order. Conflict 
and State Building. London: Routledge. 
 
Steen, Anton (2003). Political Elites and the New Russia : the Power Basis of Yeltsin's and 
Putin's Regimes. London: Routledge. 
 
Tarrow, Sidney (1994). Power in Movement : Social Movements, Collective Action and 
Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Thompson, William R, and Richard Tucker (1997). A Tale of Two Democratic Peace 
Critiques. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 41(3): 428-454. 
 
Tishkov, Valery A (1997). Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: 
The Mind Aflame. London: Sage. 
 




Tolz, Vera (2001). Russia. London: Arnold. 
 
Trenin, Dmitri V., and Aleksei V. Malashenko (2004). Russia's Restless Frontier. The 
Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia. Washington D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. 
 
Van Evera, Stephen (1994). Hypotheses on Nationalism and War. International Security. 
18(4): 5-39. 
 
White, Stephen, Ian McAllister, and Richard Rose (1997). How Russia Votes. Chatham: 
Chatham House Publishers. 
 
Wilhelmsen, Julie M. (1999). Konflikt i den russiske føderasjon : to kasustudier-en 
hobbesiansk forklaring. Oslo: Universitetet. 
 
Wolf, Reinhard, Erich Weede, Andrew J. Enterline, Edward D. Mansfield, and Jack Snyder 
(1996). Democratization and the Danger of War. International Security. 20(4): 176-
207. 
 
Yeltsin, Boris (1992). Putsch : the Diary. Three Days that Collapsed the Empire. Oakville: 
Mosaic Press. 
 
Yin, Robert K. (2003). Case Study Research : Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, 
California: Sage. 
 
Østerud, Øyvind (1994). Hva er nasjonalisme? Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
 
 
 
